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ABOVE CONTEMPT?: REGULATING
GOVERNMENT OVERREACHING IN
TERRORISM CASES
Peter Margulies*
The exigencies of law and terrorism cases tempt the government to
overreach in attempting to control information. Prosecutors struggle with
this temptation in each phase of a criminal proceeding, from investigation
through trial, as they make crucial decisions about what information to
disclose and highlight when dealing with courts, juries, and the public.
Absent such exigencies, courts, defense counsel, the media, and internal
oversight place constraints on the prosecutor's efforts to monopolize
information. Extraordinary events such as the attacks of September 11,
2001, weaken these constraints.
In times of crisis, senior law enforcement and national security officials
adopt a paradigm that this Article calls "informational overreaching."
Informational overreaching entails the erosion of three vital obligations: 1)
showing an impartial tribunal a particularized need for restraint of or
intrusion on individuals;' 2) sharing with the defense exculpatory
evidence; 2 and 3) shunning gratuitous public comments about defendants
pending or during trial.3 When senior officials discount these obligations,
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Kathleen Clark, Linda Fisher,
Bruce Green, Sam Levine, Dan Richman, Shira Scheindlin, Ian Weinstein, Bill Swor, David
Zlotnick, and participants at a Panel on Law, Terrorism, and Civil Liberties After September 11 at
the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and a Workshop of the New
England Clinical Law Teachers for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232-33 (1983) (articulating probable cause
requirement under Fourth Amendment as based on "totality of the circumstances"); Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1978) (discussing requirements for accuracy in affidavits
supporting warrant applications).
2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
3. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1966); see also Att'y Grievance Comm.
v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 575 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (reprimanding prosecutor for improper
extrajudicial comments); cf Alberto Bemabe-Riefkohl, Silence Is Golden: The New Illinois Rules
on Attorney Extrajudicial Speech, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323 (2002) (analyzing Illinois rules on
extrajudicial statements and offerings suggestions to clarify rules).
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they threaten the structure of checks and balances within the criminal
justice system.
Taken together, these three obligations protect equality and strengthen
the rule of law. Requiring particularity ensures that the government cannot
detain or restrain people based on forbidden criteria of status, identity, or
political belief.4 Requiring disclosure ensures fairness within the system of
adjudication. The two acting together winnow out charges that target
people based on invidious grounds. Requiring circumspection prevents the
government from creating a climate of condemnation that prompts fact-
f'mders to draw inferences based on stereotypes instead of evidence. By
eroding these obligations, the government becomes a monolith, unchecked
by the safeguards that the legal system relies upon to hold it accountable.
Cases after September 11 reflect this trend toward informational
overreaching. In a well-known case, United States v. Moussaoui,5 the
Fourth Circuit reinstated a notice of death penalty6 despite the government's
refusal to grant the accused "twentieth hijacker" access to detainees who
could offer evidence that he was not involved in the September 11 attacks.7
In another case, United States v. Koubriti,8 then Attorney General Ashcroft
4. Cf Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv. 946, 953-
64 (2002) (detailing author's own experience with discriminatory law enforcement); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999) (analyzing problems with racial profiling in law enforcement).
5. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Moussaoui IV'), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385). The government's case against Zacharias Moussaoui has been
vigorously contested. The rulings discussed in this Article are the orders and appeals from United
States v. Moussaoui, No. CR 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003)
("Moussaoui T), appeal dismissed by 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Moussaoui Ir'), and United
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("Moussaoui lIr'), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Moussaoui IV'), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556
(U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385). In April 2005, Moussaoui pleaded guilty to all of the charges
against him. See Neil Lewis, Moussaoui Tells Court He's Guilty of a Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES,
April 23, 2005, at Al. However, issues regarding access to exculpatory information are likely to
figure heavily in the penalty phase of the proceedings.
6. Moussaoui IV, 382 F.3d at 459, 482.
7. Id. at 458. Line prosecutors litigating the case had little or no control over the
government's decision to bar the defendant's access to al Qaeda leaders held in an undisclosed
location. However, neither the disclosure of the information nor the prosecutors' lack of control
over decisions made at a higher level lessens the prejudice that the defendant will encounter at
trial because of the government's refusal. See Moussaoui 111, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (striking
government's notice of intent to seek death penalty and precluding introduction of evidence
relating to events of September 11 where government declined to make available to defendant a
person in government custody who could have provided exculpatory testimony).
8. 305 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("Koubriti I'). In Koubriti II, the district court
issued a formal admonition to then Attorney General Ashcroft for violating a court order limiting
extrajudicial comments. Id. at 764-65; cf Richard A. Serrano, Prosecutor in Terror Case Sues
Justice Department, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at A14 (describing lawsuit by lead prosecutor in
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claimed without factual support that the defendants had advance knowledge
of the September 11 attacks9 and vouched for the government's chief
witness' o despite a court order prohibiting extrajudicial remarks. A line
prosecutor in the case also failed to turn over to the defense a letter that cast
doubt on the chief witness's account." Until recently, the defendants' only
remedy was an admonition from the court to Ashcroft.'
2
In United States v. Awadallah,'3 the Second Circuit held that the
government could still detain as a material witness a defendant whose initial
arrest constituted an illegal seizure merely because the defendant had failed
to come forward after the September 11 attacks.' 4  Along with the
government's efforts to detain alleged unlawful combatants indefinitely
without evidentiary hearings,' 5 withhold the names of immigration
detainees,16 and monitor attorney-client conversations, 17 these cases reveal a
Koubriti alleging that officials in Washington were more concerned with publicity than providing
support for the prosecution).
9. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
10. Id. at 734-35.
11. John J. Goldman, Judge Criticizes Prosecutors for Holding Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2003, at A17.
12. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 764-65. Ultimately, the government moved to vacate the
convictions because it had not turned over exculpatory evidence to the defense, and the court
granted the government's motion. See Koubriti v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (E.D.
Mich. 2004) ("Koubriti IV'); see also infra note 236.
13. 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Awadallah 1'), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861 (2005).
14. Id. at 70-71.
15. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696-98 (2004) (finding federal jurisdiction under
habeas statute to hear petitions of alleged al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,- 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that United States citizen detained as
alleged enemy combatant was entitled to procedural protections of "receiv[ing] notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker"); cf Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004, at 26, 28 (praising the Court's rejection of plenary executive
branch authority while arguing that the "verdicts and reasoning" of the Hamdi, Rasul, and
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), "will be understood as having much more power to
constrain the govemement's treatment of its prisoners"); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to
Rights during Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2004) (presenting analysis focusing on
relationship among three branches), at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol5/issl/artl/; Peter
Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight ": Exigency, Institutional Equity, and
Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004) [hereinafter Margulies, Judging
Terror] (analyzing courts' role in reconciling exigency, equality, and integrity of legal system and
arguing that courts should require due process protections such as a right to counsel for alleged
unlawful combatants).
16. See Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding government withholding of names), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104
(2004).
17. See Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client
2005]
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pattern of excess and overreaching by the executive.
Under normal conditions, courts address such excess through a
relational paradigm.'8 Courts treat prosecutors as fellow repeat-players in
the criminal process, relying on reputational sanctions to ensure appropriate
conduct and invoking formal sanctions infrequently. For example, courts
faced with offending conduct such as a prosecutor's excessive public
discussion of a pending case may address such behavior by criticizing the
prosecutor in a written opinion. 19 This step is rare; rarer still are occasions
where a court holds a prosecutor in contempt.20
Reflecting this relational perspective, legal doctrines for curbing
informational overreaching offer law enforcement officials substantial
leeway. For example, courts rarely find that inaccuracies in affidavits
supporting warrant applications require exclusion of the evidence
obtained.2' Similarly, it seems courts will order a new trial in response to
misconduct such as excessive public discussion or failure to disclose
information to the defense only on a showing of clear and irremediable
prejudice to the defendant.22
Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 145
(2004); see also Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of
Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003) [hereinafter
Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity].
18. See generally Walter W. Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century:
Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprise, in THE TwENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 33, 59 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Powell, The Capitalist Firm] (outlining relational paradigm); Ian R. Macneil,
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483 (same); Stewart
Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian
Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 775 (2000) (same).
For discussions of relational and informal interactions in criminal law, see Roberta K.
Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex Parte Relationship Between the Judge and the Prosecutor,
79 NEB. L. REV. 251 (2000) (discussing patterns of tacit and active collaboration between courts
and prosecutors); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002) [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors'
Ethics] (discussing advantages of formal and informal regulation of prosecutors by courts); Peter
Margulies, Battered Bargaining: Domestic Violence and Plea Negotiation in the Criminal Justice
System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 153, 178-80 (2001) [hereinafter Margulies,
Battered Bargaining] (arguing for judicial and legislative checks on prosecutorial practice
regarding sentencing of defendants such as some couriers or "mules" in drug transactions whose
fear of domestic violence played role in offense); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 799-801 (2003) [hereinafter Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents] (discussing interaction of local legal culture with national norms).
19. See Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors'Ethics, supra note 18, at 404.
20. Id. Professors Green and Zacharias also note that "the presiding judge can refer the
prosecutor to the state bar for discipline." Id. at 404-05.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 720-21 (2d Cir. 2000).
22. See Koubriti 11, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
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Generally, this architecture of sanctions maintains an equilibrium
between the court and the prosecutor, although defense lawyers maintain
that the edifice created leaves them out in the cold.23 In times of heightened
public anxiety, however, executive branch officials reject the tempering
influence of the relational paradigm and its core value of comity between
branches. Responding to broader political imperatives, senior officials re-
frame law enforcement and national security discourse in the Manichaean
terms of "us" versus "them., 24 This signaling from senior levels transforms
incentives for lower-level officials such as line prosecutors, overwhelming
the capacity of the informal sanctions and quiescent case law relied on by
the relational paradigm. As these constraints fade, informational
overreaching threatens to become the new norm of law enforcement.
Frightening chapters in American history, including the persecution of
dissenters during World War 1,25 the Palmer Raids and subsequent
deportation of "radicals" after the war,26 and the conduct of cases such as
the Rosenberg espionage trial after World War 11,27 illustrate the dangers of
this monolithic turn. 8 The post-9/1 1 era echoes these troubling episodes.
Courts can slow informational overreaching through an institutional
response-what one commentator decrying the toothlessness of case law in
an earlier era envisioned as a "heightened sense of judicial activism.,
29
23. See Flowers, supra note 18, at 253; cf Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and
Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2103, 2143-59 (2003) (arguing that federal Sentencing Guidelines create tacit alliance between
prosecutors and courts that penalizes zealous advocacy by defense attorneys).
24. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 587 (1984) (criticizing Manichaean dualism in corporate law
context).
25. See generally PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (1979).
26. See Betty Houchin Winfield, "To Support and Defend the Constitution of the United
States Against All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic": Four Types of Attorneys General and
Wartime Stress, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1095, 1106 (2004).
27. See generally Michael E. Parrish, Revisited: The Rosenberg "Atom Spy" Case, 68
UMKC L. REV. 601 (2000).
28. See, e.g., JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION 69-77
(1999) (discussing the Vietnam-era COINTELPRO project that engaged in surveillance and
infiltration of anti-war organizations).
29. Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 629, 654 (1972). This author's own work on law and terrorism has focused on
institutional concerns involving courts, agencies, the legal profession, and transnational violent
networks. Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15 (discussing judicial role in times of crisis);
Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity, supra note 17 (noting importance of making
transnational networks accountable, while preserving defense lawyer's role as check on state
power); Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After
September 11, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 481 [hereinafter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals] (stressing
2005]
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There is precedent for such a response in two strands of remedies that
became salient in the 1960s. First, courts could curb prosecutorial excess in
the same way that they approach derelictions of duty in state and local
institutions such as schools, jails, and psychiatric hospitals, using equitable
discretion and threats of contempt. 30  The courts would use these tools in
the service of institutional reform. Second, courts could use their powers as
the Supreme Court did in Miranda v. Arizona3 1 and fashion prophylactic
rules that deter informational overreaching.
An institutional approach would require substantial modifications in
three complementary areas of criminal procedure. First, to preserve
particularity as a basis for judicial authorization of restraint or intrusion
against an individual, courts would have to read the requirement in Franks
that warrant applications not be recklessly inaccurate 32 to apply more
rigorously to material omissions. Second, courts should hold that a pattern
of informational overreaching in a case gives rise to a presumption of
prejudice sufficient to require a new trial. Third, in considering findings of
contempt or other remedies for lawyer misconduct, courts should focus on
organizational integrity, not individual intent. Stressing organizational
integrity would promote greater ex ante concern by prosecutors with the
prevention of informational overreaching.
Such an institutional approach admittedly cuts against the grain of
recent Supreme Court precedent. The trend has been toward narrowing the
courts' equitable authority over law enforcement. Concerns about
separation of powers33  and institutional competence 34  have given
momentum to this jurisprudential drive. The consequences of an
institutional approach-new trials or dismissals of charges against persons
charged with activities related to terrorism-also seem radically
need for both flexibility and limits on power of the political branches in dealing with exigency).
30. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015, 1029-33 (2004) (discussing use of judicial
remedies to promote experimentation and innovation in mental health public institutions); cf
Esteban v. Cook, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-62 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (ruling that once a state agency
decides to provide wheelchairs to people with mobility impairments caused by conditions such as
multiple sclerosis, it had an obligation under the federal Medicaid statute to enhance their options
for life and work by obtaining technologically up-to-date wheelchairs).
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992) (limiting exercise ofjudicial
supervisory power in cases involving alleged prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury).
34. See, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423, 428 (1997) (criticizing decisions based
on courts' supervisory powers that author, a federal judge and former federal prosecutor, regards
as exceeding authority and intruding unwisely on prosecutorial decisions).
[Vol. 34
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counterintuitive, if not downright perverse. These consequences would
subject the public to a risk of catastrophic harm in order to deter misconduct
by prosecutors and provide defendants, who in some cases may be factually
guilty, with a windfall out of proportion to the actual prejudice that they
have suffered.
Viewed in greater depth, however, an institutional approach addresses
harms that would otherwise go unremedied. This is particularly true if one
views the "institution" here as being the network of practices and discourse
that motivates terrorism prosecutions generally. Abuses in one case have
an effect on other cases, making abuses easier to tolerate, enhancing the
climate of condemnation for all defendants, and weakening the mechanisms
of accountability that hold law enforcement officials in check. Carried to
their ultimate conclusion, the unchecked propagation of such images of
alien terror 35 can have two disastrous consequences: first, a diminution in
the fair trial rights and other civil liberties of groups identified as
embodying a higher risk of terrorist activity; and second, as a backlash to
the first, a popular disillusion not merely with prosecutorial excess, but also
with the more careful and focused law enforcement necessary to address the
genuine threats posed by violent networks such as al Qaeda. By addressing
each of these concerns, an institutional response by courts serves liberty and
security.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses how important
checks on informational overreaching by prosecutors are to the rule of law.
Part II outlines courts' application of the relational paradigm for dealing
with informational overreaching. Part III outlines the cascade of
informational overreaching triggered by senior law enforcement officials'
response to crises such as the September 11 attacks. Part IV sets out an
institutional response by courts that would address governmental excess.
Finally, Part V responds to two possible criticisms of the institutional
approach: claims that it will intrude on the separation of powers and/or
generate unintended consequences that adversely affect defendants.
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND INFORMATIONAL OVERREACHING
The fragile system of accountability at the heart of our criminal justice
system depends on sound prosecutorial practices regarding the distribution
and disclosure of information. Prosecutors have a duty under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to see that justice is done, rather than merely
35. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2002) [hereinafter Cole, Enemy
Aliens].
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to engage in zealous advocacy for a particular position. 36 The content and
scope of the duty to do justice with respect to information hinges on the
audience with which the prosecutor interacts. As a general matter, the
prosecutor serves justice best through candor with the court and the
defendant and restraint in communications with the public. Finding the
right balance of candor and restraint helps determine the fairness of the
system for defendants and targets of investigations.
Three areas of information policy are crucial. The government should:
1) show a particularized need for coercion or restraint; 2) share with the
defense exculpatory evidence; and 3) refrain from gratuitous public
comments about defendants pending or during trial.
Few concerns are more carefully ingrained in our system than the
requirement that the government aver with particularity why a court should
order the restraint or coercion of an individual.37  Without such a
requirement, governments are free to visit their power on individuals and
groups based on attributes of identity or status, such as ethnicity, national
origin, religion, or political belief.3H Dispensing with particularity makes
the government's assertions of authority effectively unreviewable. If the
government can detain an individual as an "enemy of the people," it is
unclear what evidence the target can marshal to demonstrate the falsity of
such an amorphous rubric. Even if the criminal law itself defines offenses
with particularity, allowing detention prior to adjudication on a vague
showing by the government undermines such substantive provisions.
As an example of the importance of particularity, consider the law
regarding material witnesses. Courts and legislatures have long accepted
that the prosecution may hold persons as material witnesses to preserve the
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2002) ("Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor"); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.
37. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) ("The Fourth Amendment by its terms
requires particularity .... "); cf Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) ("[T]he
[particularity] requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications,
and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended
to prohibit.").
38. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (striking down Chicago anti-
loitering ordinance on the grounds that it was vague and allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement).
[Vol. 34
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government's ability to call them at trial.39 Judicial decisions have also
interpreted statutes to permit the government to hold people as material
witnesses before grand juries, reasoning that grand juries also qualify as
"criminal proceedings" requiring the preservation of relevant and material
evidence of the commission of a crime.40 In the past, courts have carefully
confined this authority by requiring a particularized showing that obtaining
the witness's cooperation without a warrant is "impracticable.Al Courts
have even rejected evidence that might plausibly meet this standard, such as
apparent attempts to avoid detection by the authorities, if the government
cannot unequivocally demonstrate that an individual has declined to
cooperate.42 The particularity requirement makes it more difficult for
prosecutors to detain an apparently law-abiding individual based on broad
suspicions, in the hope that the detention itself will "shake loose" more
concrete and incriminating information.
A comparable rationale of systemic integrity also undergirds the
second example of constraints on prosecutors' informational overreaching:
disclosure by prosecutors of evidence that exculpates the defendant. From
an ex post perspective, the prosecutor must turn over exculpatory evidence
to the defense to offer the defense a fair opportunity to use this evidence on
the defendant's behalf.43 A trial without such an opportunity increases the
risk that the jury will base its verdict not on the evidence, but on inferences
stemming from the defendant's membership in a disfavored group. Failure
to turn over evidence that could have persuaded the jury of the defendant's
innocence mandates a new trial.44 From an ex ante perspective, moreover,
the obligation to disclose also requires prosecutors to base their cases on
reliable evidence, instead of merely trying to leverage the public's invidious
suspicions.
The third area, rules limiting pre-trial publicity, similarly stems from
concern about the influence of fear and preconceptions of the legal process.
However, concerns here focus on a different audience: the members of the
public comprising the jury pool. Because the audience changes in this
fashion, the default rule changes as well. Instead of greater disclosure, the
39. See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 936-41 (9th Cir. 1971).
40. See id.; Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 61-64 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861
(2005); In re Material Witness Wan-ant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
federal material witness statute applied to grand jury proceedings).
41. Bacon, 449 F.2d at 943.
42. Id. at 944-45 (holding that government failed to demonstrate impracticability of securing
witness's testimony, even when police apprehended witness in location that suggested she wished
to hide from federal agents).
43. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
44. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
2005]
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legal system expects that lawyers preparing a case for trial before a jury will
minimize public comments about the case to preserve the integrity of
adjudication.
Legal rules require lawyers to strive to ensure that juries can discharge
their function by viewing the evidence in the case in conjunction with the
safeguards, such as cross-examination and the rule against hearsay, that the
trial process imposes. A juror, if not completely free from preconceptions,
must at least be able to obtain some distance from those preconceptions for
the whole notion of a trial to be meaningful, as opposed to merely a
ratification of "conventional wisdom" about guilt or innocence in the
community.45
Public comments by prosecutors are especially troublesome. Members
of the public, the potential jury pool, and empanelled but not sequestered
jurors will often see the federal prosecutor as "cloaked with the authority of
the United States Government" and as "the community's representative,, 46
rather than as merely an attorney for a client. Remarks to the public can
skew public debate, thereby frustrating public deliberation, corrupting the
jury pool,47 encouraging government overreaching, and intimidating
supporters of the defendants.
To avoid such consequences, both professional codes and departmental
regulations impose special obligations on prosecutors. The American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that prosecutors
"refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial
45. Restraints on pretrial publicity must be tailored to honor First Amendment guarantees.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-49 (1991) (supporting limits on pretrial
publicity and holding that Nevada rule was void for vagueness); cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is
Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 (1998)
(arguing that virtually all limits on pretrial publicity fail under the First Amendment).
46. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d Cir. 1981) (criticizing a prosecutor
for improperly vouching for a witness during trial).
47. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 840 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts are proactive in high-
profile cases in dealing with issues of pretrial publicity. For instance, a court may impose a "gag
order" during the pendency and conduct of a trial to bar both the prosecution and defense from
discussing the case in a manner likely to influence potential jurors. In Cutler, the court cited a
well-known criminal defense attorney for contempt based on the finding that the attorney had
violated a court order by repeatedly and publicly denouncing the government's witnesses as
"liars" and making other comments before trial about evidence in the case, with the express
purpose of "poison[ing] the well from which the jury would be selected." Id.; cf Gentile, 501
U.S. at 1036-37 (plurality opinion) (stressing importance of limits on lawyer's use of pretrial
publicity under the First Amendment); United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 95 (3d Cir. 2001)
(striking down a gag order imposed on former criminal defense counsel); Judith L. Maute, "In
Pursuit of Justice " in High Profile Criminal Matters, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1755-59 (2002)
(discussing issues of pre-trial publicity); Marjorie P. Slaughter, Lawyers and the Media: The Right
to Speak Versus the Duty to Remain Silent, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1997) (same).
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likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused., 48 Federal
regulations echo these sentiments. Regulations bar disclosure of any
"subjective observations" made by prosecutors.49  They specifically
discourage statements made at a time approaching or during trial.5
Furthermore, they caution against public comments regarding witness
credibility or evidence.5 1 Finally, the regulations require the permission of
the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General to release information
covered by the guidelines. 2
In sum, both constitutional and ethical strictures mandate a balance of
candor and restraint in prosecutors' use of information. Unfortunately,
prosecutors do not always manifest this sense of balance. Part II will
outline the courts' approach to curbing informational overreaching.
II. MANAGING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: THE RELATIONAL
PARADIGM
A relational paradigm accounts for most judicial responses to
prosecutorial misconduct regarding the disclosure or distribution of
information. This approach relies principally on informal sanctions and
disfavors legal remedies such as dismissal of charges or invocation of the
contempt power. The relational approach has some virtue in addressing
misconduct by line prosecutors, who have incentives to preserve their
reputation with judges. Unfortunately, external pressures on prosecutors
weaken these incentives, thereby undermining the core assumptions of the
relational perspective.
To understand the development of the relational perspective, it is useful
to think about the legal system as an institution consisting of interrelated
ways of thinking, speaking, and doing.53 Institutions spill over formal
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(o (2002); cf Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., "May
It Please the Camera .... I Mean the Court"--An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial
Problem, 39 GA. L. REv. 83 (2004) (arguing for more vigorous judicial oversight regarding
extrajudicial remarks by prosecutors and defense attorneys).
49. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(3)(iv) (2004).
50. Id. § 50.2(b)(5).
51. Id. § 50.2(b)(6)(iv), (v).
52. Id. § 50.2(b)(9). In addition, the United States Attorneys' Manual mandates fairness and
accuracy in public comments made by federal prosecutors. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 1-7.110 (2003). The Manual also recommends that answers to reporters' questions
should not go beyond the contents of the indictment. Id. § 1-7.520; see also id. § 1-7.401
("Guidance for Press Conferences and Other Media Contacts").
53. The discussion here borrows heavily from an earlier analysis in Peter Margulies, The New
Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 487,
497-98 (1999) [hereinafter Margulies, Public Interest Law] (discussing institutional dimension of
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organizational structures, comprising "interpretive communities, 54 with a
common "set of material practices and symbolic constructions '55 involving
cognitive frameworks, rhetoric, and routines.
The history of relational agreements suggests that parties engaged in
ongoing institutional relationships develop a common law for that
relationship that governs their conduct with fewer transaction costs than
those generated by legal intervention. In the commercial setting, for
example, where scholars first outlined the relational model, a customer and
her supplier develop a "mutual orientation ... based on knowledge that the
parties assume each has about the other and upon which they draw in
communication and problem solving. 56  The parties' joint stake in the
discourse and practice in public law litigation). Cf Peter Margulies, Public Interest Lawyering
and the Pragmatist Dilemma, in RENASCENT PRAGMATISM: STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 220, 225-30 (Alfonso Morales ed., 2003) (arguing that instrumental concerns often
marginalize dialogue with affected parties in law reform efforts).
54. See Margulies, Public Interest Law, supra note 53, at 497; cf BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 148 (1997)
[hereinafter TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY] (elaborating on Stanley Fish's notion
of a legal interpretive community, consisting of "groups of people bound together by shared
knowledge, language or terminology, and often a basic corpus of ideas, beliefs, and attitudes. One
becomes a member of an interpretive community by undergoing indoctrination-by learning and
internalizing the shared 'meaning system' of the interpretive community"); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
Pragmatic Response to the Embarrassing Problems of Ideology Critique in Socio-Legal Studies,
in RENASCENT PRAGMATISM, supra note 53, at 60 ("truth ... is the product of a community of
inquirers operating within shared practices"). This view fits within a postmodern perspective that
situates human agency in a nest of practices and cognitive paths. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two
Lectures, in POWERIKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, at
78, 96 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980) (urging study of how power "invests itself in institutions,
becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments"); cf Steven L. Winter, The
"Power" Thing, 82 VA. L. REv. 721 (1996) (interpreting Foucault).
55. See Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices,
and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
232, 248 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); cf MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS
REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 214 (1998) ("Every institutional role carries with it a remarkably
complex set of behavioral expectations, expectations that exist in the minds of the institution's
members."); Sue E. S. Crawford & Elinor Ostrom, A Grammar ofInstitutions, 89 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 582, 582 (1995) (describing institutions as "enduring regularities of human action in
situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world"); cf
TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY, supra note 54, at 149 (discussing the "internal
attitude [that] is the (phenomenological) cognitive style or framework of thought which
characterizes thinking while engaging in a given practice"); Richman, Prosecutors and Their
Agents, supra note 18 (discussing institutional dimensions of interaction between prosecutors and
agents in federal law enforcement).
56. Powell, The Capitalist Firm, supra note 18, at 59; Macneil, supra note 18 (discussing
legal and empirical theory of relational contracting); Macaulay, supra note 18 (same); Robert Eli
Rosen, "We're All Consultants Now": How Change in Client Organizational Strategies
Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 637, 646
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flourishing of the relationship makes "voice"--communication-a more
efficient and appropriate initial response than "exit"-terminating the
relationship or invoking the legal process-when one party feels that the
other has departed from shared assumptions about appropriate conduct.
57
While one party might gain in the short-term from undermining these
assumptions for a unilateral benefit, the "'entangling strings' of reputation,
friendship, and interdependence" 58 constrain such strategic behavior. 0
This relational view also characterizes the interaction between federal
district courts and federal prosecutors. Individual line prosecutors appear
on an ongoing basis before federal district judges. They must act in a way
that preserves their credibility and reputation if they hope to secure the
district judge's good will in a range of determinations such as detention
hearings, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing.59 Courts in turn come to rely
on the candor and professionalism of individual line prosecutors.
Moreover, judges at both the trial and appellate levels have frequently
served as federal prosecutors earlier in their careers. 60 Reflecting the depth
of these ongoing ties, courts evaluating cases of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct acknowledge the efforts of the "relatively young attorneys,
seeking valuable experience as a prelude to other professional endeavors,
61
who serve as federal prosecutors and "the high level of conduct that has
traditionally characterized the office of the United States Attorney. 62
In keeping with this relational analysis, courts tend to view informal
sanctions of prosecutors as being preferable to formal sanctions. Typically,
(2002) (discussing Macneil in the area of team members); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Informal
Methods of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (2003)
(discussing credibility as a value that promotes responsibility among lawyers). *
57. See Powell, The Capitalist Firm, supra note 18, at 59;, ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30-43
(1970) (discussing role of "voice" in preventing complacency within institutions). Market
mechanisms and legal rules supply an implicit threat of retaliation if one party fails to meet the
legitimate expectations of the other. If the supplier fails to come up with goods that are adequate,
the customer can go elsewhere. The law provides default rules that govern when one party defects
to realize a one-shot gain. However, most commercial relationships govern themselves
satisfactorily through shared stakes and understandings about mutual interests.
58. Powell, The Capitalist Firm, supra note 18, at 59.
59. See Flowers, supra note 18, at 265-68; cf Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra
note 18, at 797 (discussing importance of reputation and credibility of institutional actors in
federal law enforcement). Obviously, a judge's view of a particular prosecutor's trustworthiness
and competence is not the sole factor on which a judge will rely in deciding a case. However, a
prudent prosecutor will generally not underestimate its importance.
60. Flowers, supra note 18, at 268-69; Gleeson, supra note 34, at 423 n.* ("The author[, a
United States District Judge,] was formerly an Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the
Criminal Division in the Eastern District of New York.").
61. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 1186.
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these sanctions are reputational in nature, sending the message that the court
can diminish the "professional capital" that line prosecutors seek to
accumulate with courts, colleagues, the legal community, and the public.63
In most cases of possible prosecutorial misconduct, courts appeal either
expressly or implicitly to the tradition of in-house mentoring in United
States Attorney's offices that imparts relational knowledge, through the
"able attorneys who supervise federal prosecutors." 64 Trial courts favor
indications of disapproval of line prosecutors that may never appear in the
record, such as off the record admonishments or informing the prosecutor's
superiors. 65 In cases of more serious misconduct, a judge may write an
opinion criticizing the prosecutor's conduct.66 When the conduct is still
more problematic, the court may take the extreme step of mentioning the
prosecutor by name. 67  More formal sanctions, such as findings of
contempt, imposition of fines, or other remedies, are rare in cases involving
prosecutors. 68 Legal remedies that would inure to the benefit of criminal
defendants, such as the exclusion of evidence or the grant of a mistrial or a
new trial, are also very difficult to obtain, often hinging on a showing of
actual and direct prejudice.69 Indeed, courts sometimes argue that such
defendant-centered remedies are less effective than reputational sanctions in
controlling prosecutorial misconduct, including the use of pre-trial
publicity.7°
A relational view of prosecutor-judicial interaction provides a valuable
form of accountability to prosecutors. Interaction with judges helps
prosecutors do justice, tempering zeal with compassion. For example, a
regime granting judges significant discretion in sentencing would oblige
prosecutors from the start of a criminal case to consider a judge's view of
what is fair and equitable.7' In this fashion, relationships between courts
63. See Wendel, supra note 56 (discussing concept of "social capital" among lawyers).
64. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1186.
65. Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, supra note 18, at 404.
66. Id.
67. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 80-81 (1995) (noting that judge's contempt
power is rarely used, and only when prosecutorial misconduct is egregious or intentional and in
the courtroom); Alschuler, supra note 29, at 673-76.
69. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (holding that court
must find prejudice against defendant in order to dismiss charges despite prosecutorial misconduct
during grand jury proceedings).
70. See Modica, 663 F.2d at 1184.
71. See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 727 (1999) (discussing prosecutor's need to
"consciously consider the costs of the technique prospectively"); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the
[Vol. 34:
ABOVE CONTEMPT?
and prosecutors humanize the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
leavening the mechanical application of the criminal law by allowing more
room for factors such as a defendant's age, socio-economic background,
family obligations, or relative guilt within a criminal enterprise, to shape
charging decisions.72
Courts sometimes express concern that reputational sanctions are
insufficient to deter prosecutorial misconduct. One court noted that a
pattern of misconduct that persists despite the application of reputational
sanctions undercuts the legitimacy of the relational model; invocations of
the reciprocity at the core of the model begin to seem like "helpless
piety, 73 reflecting "purely ceremonial 74 recitations instead of pragmatic
remedies.
This reliance on relational governance encounters further strains when
external pressures shift the balance of power between court and
prosecutor.75 In recent years, the most pervasive external pressure has been
Market for Snitches, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 563, 614 (1999) [hereinafter Weinstein, Regulating the
Market] (stating that "decisions [are] driven by forces other than law enforcement concerns," such
as sentencing decisions in districts where judges "readily mitigate sentences"); cf Margulies,
Battered Bargaining, supra note 18, at 170-71 (2001) (arguing for greater prosecutorial regard for
survivors of domestic violence coerced into crime by their abusers). See generally Fred C.
Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998) (discussing
standards for prosecutors).
72. Unfortunately, the absence of accountability for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
can also lead to abuses. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 758 (1999) (discussing
expansion of prosecutorial power resulting from an expanding scope of federal criminal law);
Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?,
83 VA. L. REV. 939 (1997) [hereinafter Richman, Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability]
(analyzing lack of accountability of federal prosecutors and risk of enforcement based on
stereotypes); cf Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 31-38 (1998) (discussing interplay of prosecutorial discretion and race
and arguing that prosecutors pay insufficient attention to perceived racial inequities); Abbe Smith,
Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 368-72
(2001) (same); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the
Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811 (1998) (same, but focusing on capital cases).
73. Modica, 66 F.3d at 1183 (quoting United States v. Benter, 457 F.2d 1174, 1178 (2d Cir.
1972)).
74. Id.
75. The equilibrium between prosecutor and judge is not an unmixed blessing. Defense
lawyers, for example, have long harbored the suspicion that judges are too dependent on and
solicitous of prosecutors. The very fact that a prosecutor appears often before a particular judge
may encourage the judge to treat occasional misconduct leniently, at least if it appears to be
isolated. Cf United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239-40 (1940) (holding that
prosecutor's statements to jury were harmless because they occurred in the course of a long trial);
Alschuler, supra note 29, at 658-61 (criticizing application of harmless error rule as leading to
undue leniency regarding prosecutorial misconduct). The defendant and defense counsel may feel
frozen out of the judge-prosecutor relationship. To the extent that this is true, the relational
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the trend toward more rigid sentencing, embodied in mandatory minimums
and the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The direction of this trend
has been called into question by the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Booker.76 Today, the locus of discretion in a criminal case often is
the point when a prosecutor decides whether to charge a prospective
defendant or to place a matter before a grand jury.77 Before Booker, courts
had fewer opportunities to exercise discretion in sentencing. Instead of
taking a range of equitable factors into account, judges often confined
themselves to approving a motion made by a prosecutor for a downward
departure in the defendant's sentence based on his substantial cooperation.78
However, after the Booker decision, the Supreme may have returned
sentencing discretion to the district judge.79 The relational approach does
approach may be not so much an ideal as a bare minimum that actually masks significant injustice
to defendants. Inadequacies in the relational approach serve to emphasize the perils of external
pressures that further enhance the leverage of prosecutors.
76. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory, but
rather advisory, such that a court must consider the guideline range but is not bound to follow it).
Booker's effect on the judge-prosecutor relationship is still in question. One the one hand, the
district court judge may rely even more on prosecutors to help sentence the defendant. On the
other hand, a judge may decide to independently evaluate the sentencing factors and disregard the
prosecutor's recommendation. This behavior will probably ultimately come down to the character
of the individual judge. Ultimately, Congress is likely to enact legislation providing for
mandatory minimum sentences for more federal sentences. This development will serve to
exacerbate the situation noted in the text.
Over time, the Guidelines had developed fault lines in which individual line prosecutors,
prompted by both their own misgivings over sentences that seem unduly harsh and by the public
and private pronouncements to the same effect by judges, worked with courts to mitigate
sentences. See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 87, 87-88 (2003) [hereinafter Weinstein, Mandatory Minimums] (arguing that courts and
prosecutors have worked to humanize sentencing regarding non-drug offenses, but that mandatory
minimum sentences have frustrated such efforts in the narcotics area); cf Frank 0. Bowman, III &
Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion 11: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences
Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 559-60 (2002) (arguing that even in
drug sentencing prosecutors' and courts' perception of equities and sensitivity to local views has
tempered practice). Prior to Booker, actions by both Congress and senior Justice Department
officials, such as the restrictions on downward departures and the scrutiny ofjudges who authorize
departures too often, represented efforts to stifle this return to a relational ethos.
77. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980). See generally Gerard E.
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
78. However, the extent of the departure is within the judge's discretion. See Weinstein,
Mandatory Minimums, supra note 76, at 93.
79. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738. Nevertheless, some district court judges have turned down
the Supreme Court's offer to exercise their discretion in sentencing defendants and instead have
chosen to continue to follow the Guidelines. See United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056,
1062 (D. Neb. 2005) (holding that "Guidelines must be given substantial weight even though they
are now advisory"); United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) ("[Iln all
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far less to promote prosecutorial accountability when external pressures
such as the Sentencing Guidelines reduce judges to the status of ministerial
functionaries presiding over guilty pleas.
When prosecutors have more power, the manner in which senior law
enforcement officials articulate and implement priorities becomes crucial.
Senior officials can mold the institutional power they wield to preserve the
dialogue at the core of the relational approach. More ominously, senior
officials can wield their power in ways that marginalize the courts.
Concerns about national security and terrorism provide a convenient
opening for officials seeking to exercise such sweeping authority. That is
the focus of Part III.
III. INFORMATIONAL OVERREACHING AS PARADIGM SHIFT
In times of crisis, senior law enforcement officials reject the relational
paradigm in favor of a monolithic approach to information control. Plenary
control over information, rather than collaboration with other institutional
actors, becomes the strategy of choice for both alleviating immediate risks
to public safety and reaping political rewards. As the institutional signals
sent by senior officials work their way down through the bureaucracy,
constraints on informational overreaching by prosecutors erode, threatening
constitutional values.
Official reactions to cataclysmic events, such as September 11, reflect a
process with some disconcerting parallels to the process that spawned the
events themselves: the polarizing influence of "authenticity entrepreneurs ' ' 0
future sentencing, the court will give heavy weight to the Guidelines in determining an appropriate
sentence.... [T]he court will only depart from those Guidelines in unusual cases for clearly
identified and persuasive reasons.").
80. See Peter Margulies, Making "Regime Change" Multilateral: The War On Terror And
Transitions To Democracy, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 389 (2004). The model of violent
entrepreneurship developed by Charles Tilly, focusing largely on non-state actors, also has
relevance for analysis of public officials with access to the violent instrumentalities of the state.
See CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 34 (2003) (discussing role of
"political entrepreneurs" who "promote violence ...by activating boundaries, stories, and
relations that have already accumulated histories of violence; by connecting already violent actors
with previously nonviolent allies; by coordinating destructive campaigns; and by representing
their constituencies through threats of violence"); cf Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their
Transformation through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998) (discussing how
small changes in perceptions and behavior prompted in part by signals from social and political
leaders can snowball into massive political upheavals and ethnic strife); Timur Kuran & Cass R.
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999) (analyzing
role of "availability entrepreneurs" in shaping public policy by leveraging stories and images that
are cognitively salient).
This author does not argue here for any form of moral equivalence between United States
officials and leaders of groups such as al Qaeda, who seek to kill massive numbers of innocents.
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who seek to purge organizations and societies of the influence of "them."
Often capitalizing on cognitively salient images of trauma and loss,
81
authenticity entrepreneurs market an essentialist account of a society's
origin story and core beliefs, and exploit fear of persons, groups, and
discourses perceived to be "outside" those boundaries. To facilitate their
work, authenticity entrepreneurs build organizations that tend to be highly
hierarchical, secretive, or homogeneous.82 The form of these institutions in
turn frames the perception of both identity and grievances in a far more
polarized fashion,83  suppressing nuance, detail, and dissent. In this
monolithic organizational structure, leaders send an array of signals, both
tacit and express, that shape behavior by lower-level organizational actors.84
The violent transnational network that engineered the September 1 1 attacks
evolved from such a process. This network both counted on and received
an official reaction in the United States that furthered this polarizing trend.
The top-down dynamic of authenticity entrepreneurship was evident in
the Ashcroft Justice Department. 85  Ashcroft rejected the nuances of the
relational paradigm as a form of creeping corruption. He told narratives
characterized by a Manichaean purity in which American law enforcement
and security officials occupy the moral high ground,86 granting themselves
Cf Kanan Makiya & Hassan Mneimneh, Manual for a 'Raid', N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 17,
2002, at 18 (discussing al Qaeda training manual for attacks on urban centers). It is not
unreasonable, however, to hold United States officials to a higher standard that reflects concern
for constitutional values. Moreover, while a state may use legally authorized force to address
threats to national security, the principle of proportionality should guide such responses. Cf
Richard Falk, Ends and Means: Defining a Just War, THE NATION, Oct. 29, 2001, at 11, 12
(justifying American resort to force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by arguing that al
Qaeda is a "transnational actor ... [whose] relationship to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
[was] contingent, with al Qaeda being more the sponsor of the state rather than the other way
around").
81. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1039-40 (2003).
82. Authenticity entrepreneurs can be animated by a quest for power, a sense of mission, or
sometimes by the force of their own fears. See TILLY, supra note 80.
83. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 429 (2002); Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003).
84. For a discussion of signaling within organizations, see Margulies, The Virtues and Vices
of Solidarity, supra note 17, at 197-99 (discussing signaling as element of command structure
within violent transnational networks); Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and
Accountability: Regulating in the Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 170 (2003) (discussing
signaling within corporate entities); ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-24 (2000)
(discussing dynamics of signaling behavior).
85. We have yet to see whether the same shall be true of the Gonzales Justice Department.
86. See Jeffrey Rosen, John Ashcroft's Permanent Campaign, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April
2004, at 68, 78 [hereinafter Rosen, John Ashcroft's Permanent Campaign] (former aide contends
that Ashcroft views the fight against terrorism as a "civilizational clash" where "these people [are
seen] as enemies of everything he believes in, as a sort of religiously based threat").
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the license to dispense with procedural protections for persons deemed not
to share those attributes. For Ashcroft, those who question the legitimacy
of this license have cast in their lot with "them.,
87
In place of a relational paradigm, Ashcroft sought to implement a
monolithic view of federal law enforcement. He insisted on secrecy, for
example, in his refusal to make public information relating to the Justice
Department's responses to the September II attacks, particularly the
immigration crackdown that resulted in the detention and deportation of
over a thousand undocumented aliens, most of whom turned out to have
nothing to do with terrorism. 88  In recent prosecutions, such as a case
involving the environmental activist group Greenpeace, 89 Ashcroft also
seemed to pursue a policy that was increasingly intolerant of dissent.
90
Moves to limit plea bargaining and to require charging the most serious
possible offense reflected this monolithic view; 91 so did efforts by Ashcroft
to intimidate federal judges who sought to depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines92 and moves to overrule local United States Attorneys who
declined to seek the death penalty.93
87. As Ashcrofl noted in testimony before Congress: "[T]o those who scare peace-loving
people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they
erode our national unity and resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to
America's friends." Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 313 (2002);
cf Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft's Ascent, THE NEW YORKER, April 15, 2002, at 50, 53 (describing
Ashcroft's view of his role after September 11). Ashcroft cast this polarizing narrative in
religious terms. Id. at 62 (noting that Ashcroft justified anti-terrorism efforts with a quote from
the Old Testament that also carried what the author described as an "unmistakable message"
regarding abortion: "'I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose
life, that both thou and thy seed may live"' (quoting Deuteronomy 30:19)).
88. See Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding government's refusal to disclose information about detainees), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
89. See Adam Liptak, Typical Greenpeace Protest Leads to an Unusual Prosecution, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at A9 (discussing Justice Department's use of "an obscure 1872 law" to
prosecute Greenpeace).
90. This same political focus was demonstrated by the dominance in Ashcroft's senior staff
of political and ideological soulmates. See Toobin, supra note 87, at 53-54 (noting the presence of
political operatives and absence of legal experts in Ashcroft's inner circle, as well as Ashcroft's
disdain for career Justice Department employees); Rosen, John Ashcroft's Permanent Campaign,
supra note 86, at 76-77 (same).
91. See Adam Liptak & Eric Lichtblau, New Plea Bargain Limits Could Swamp Courts.
Experts Say, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2003, at A23.
92. See Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. to Monitor Judges for Sentences Shorter Than
Guidelines Suggest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A12; cf David M. Zlomick, The War Within the
War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV.
211 (2004) (criticizing Justice Department policy).
93. See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General
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Ashcroft's behavior was also a powerful signal to others in the Justice
Department that the way to get ahead was to follow his lead, casting
terrorist prosecutions as high-stakes contests of good and evil.94
Bureaucracies tend to react to new challenges by "satisficing," that is,
engaging in behavior that involves either the least effort or the lowest
potential risk of embarrassment. 95  Publicity from the Attorney General
signals that casting each prosecution in stark terms, regardless of the
prejudicial impact of that approach, is a convenient path to organizational
success. 96  The result is an accelerated climate of stereotyped notions of
defendants, an impatience with procedural protections on the arrest and
interrogation of suspects, and an eagerness to view a broad range of
activities as worthy of prosecution.
97
Signaling from senior Justice Department officials has been the catalyst
for the weakening of three pillars of the rule of law regarding the control
and distribution of information by prosecutors: 1) the requirement that the
government show a particularized need for coercion or restraint; 2) the
obligation to share with the defense exculpatory evidence; and, 3) the
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697
(2003).
94. Comparable signaling behavior by the executive on the irrelevance of international law to
detainees may have helped create the climate that gave rise to the torture of detainees at Abu
Ghraib and elsewhere. See Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 15,
2004, at 4, 4 (discussing development of Bush Administration's legal position).
95. See Robert Jerome Glennon & John E. Thorson, Federal Environmental Restoration
Initiatives: An Analysis of Agency Performance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIZ. L. REV.
483, 492 (2000) (discussing "satisficing" in environmental bureaucracies and describing
"satisficing" as "tunnel vision" that leads to "sub-optimal solution[s] that minimally satisf[y] the
immediate concerns"); Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control,
Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 509, 535 (2002)
(discussing framing of incentives within bureaucratic organizations); MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND
BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 187 (1992) (discussing socio-economic and
psychological accounts of institutional change); Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio,
Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 19 (Paul J.
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991) (noting that "habit must not be seen as a purely
passive element in behavior, but rather as a means by which attention is directed to selected
aspects of a situation, to the exclusion of competing aspects that might turn choice in another
direction"); cf Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 671, 675 (2002) (noting that experts can engage in "groupthink" that may
obscure some options and perspectives).
96. See Simpson & Piquero, supra note 95, at 535 (discussing importance of perceived norms
within organization in generating either illegality or compliance with law); Diane Vaughan,
Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
23 (1998) (same).
97. See Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Antiterrorism
Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2003, at B15 (discussing Justice Department's
prosecution of individuals who participated in al Qaeda training camp, but demonstrated no
subsequent plans to engage in terrorist activity).
[Vol. 34
2005] ABOVE CONTEMPT?
obligation to refrain from public comments about defendants pending or
during trial that create a climate of condemnation. The following will
discuss each development in turn, focusing first on the historical incidence
of this dynamic, and then examining the evolution of these trends after
September 11.
A. Particularity Lost
Past crises have led to a wholesale retreat from the principle of
particularity. During World War 1, for example, the government prosecuted
hundreds of individuals based on a vague statute that barred interference in
the war effort. 98  Violations often entailed a generalized expression of
political opposition to American involvement in the war that the First
Amendment would clearly protect today.99 During the "Red Scare" after
World War I, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, along with Palmer's
assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, accelerated the trend toward persecution of
dissidents, compiling lists of tens of thousands of radicals, deporting
thousands, and setting a tone that strongly influenced American legal,
social, and political life for the next half-century.' 00 Similarly, prosecutions
during the McCarthy Era revealed a conflation of unpopular speech with
illegality that would be impermissible under present law.'0 1
98. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the "Bad Tendency" Test: Free Speech in
Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 411 (discussing the Espionage Act).
99. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); cf GERALD GUNTHER,
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 151-70 (1994) (discussing Hand's path-breaking
analysis in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917)); Stone, supra note 98; William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic
Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 387:
These Espionage and Sedition Act trials during the first Red Scare anticipated later Cold War
persecutions: the prosecution had no evidence that the defendants had actually committed
any acts that might remotely be considered seditious (aside from their dissentient utterances),
so it had to rely on party teachings. Professional informers provided their contribution....
All this was justified in the name of national security.
Other aspects of the dissenters' identity, such as immigration status, also fueled public
animus. See MURPHY, supra note 25, at 106 (noting that under immigration law passed by
Congress in 1918, "any alien who advocated anarchism, syndicalism, or violent revolution--or
who belonged to an organization that advocated any of these things--could be deported").
100. See Wiecek, supra note 99, at 389-92.
101. In addition, outside of the criminal justice process, the government detained over a
hundred thousand Japanese-Americans during World War II with no particularized suspicion that
a given detainee had committed espionage or sabotage. See Thomas Y. Fujita-Rony, Korematsu 's
Civil Rights Challenges: Plaintiffs' Personal Understandings of Constitutionally Guaranteed
Freedoms, the Defense of Civil Liberties, and Historical Context, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.
REv. 51, 59 (2003). The Supreme Court upheld this blatant use of national origin and descent as a
surrogate for particularized suspicion, although it also held that detention was illegal in the
conceded absence of suspicion. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944)
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In the present crisis, the executive has sought to weaken or evade the
particularity requirement. Immigrants and persons with Muslim, Middle
Eastern, or South Asian backgrounds have been particular targets.10 2 For
example, in the two years following September 11, the Internal Revenue
Service ("INS") detained over a thousand persons, most of them
immigrants. 0 3 However, in virtually all of the cases, the government was
unable or unwilling to demonstrate any link between these individuals and
terrorism: a classic case of persons in the wrong place at the wrong time. 04
Ashcroft had also indicated that he was willing to detain people for
"spitting on the sidewalk" and other generic offenses, on the modest chance
that they, like the hapless illegal immigrants netted by the INS, had some
connection to terrorism. 05 As part of this retreat from particularity, when
the news media and advocacy groups sought further information about
detainees the government advanced a so-called "mosaic" theory, arguing
that the release of even mundane information might assist terrorist
(upholding government order authorizing internment of Japanese-American citizens on grounds
that there was a "real military danger"); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294-95 (1944) (granting
habeas petition for Japanese-American detainee who government acknowledged did not pose risk
to national security); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1933 (2003);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of
Arab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 11-26 (2001) (drawing parallels between
Japanese-American internment and post-September 11 measures against Arabs and Muslims).
102. See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 35 (critiquing detention of immigrants after attacks);
Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals, supra note 29 (same); Letti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002) (describing the marginalization of particular communities after
September 11); Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day after September
11, SOCIAL TEXT, Fall 2002, at 101; Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights,
and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002) (same). For a political theory perspective, see BONNIE HONIG,
DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 34 (2001) (discussing "the politics of foreignness-the
cultural symbolic organization of a social crisis into a resolution-producing confrontation between
an 'us' and a 'them"').
103. See Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals, supra note 29, at 499.
104. See Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dept. of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98
n.4 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting government concession that many aliens detained or deported after
September 11 had been "'cleared of wrongdoing' and that none had ties "to the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon"), affd in part, rev'd in part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); cf Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 675,
725-26 (discussing lack of concrete information about terrorism yielded by government's
immigration measures); Adam Liptak, The Pursuit of Immigrants in America After Sept. 11, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2003, § 4, at 14 (same) [hereinafter Liptak, The Pursuit of Immigrants].
105. See Adam Liptak, Under Ashcroft, Judicial Power Flows Back to Washington, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, § 4, at 5 (discussing prosecutors' broad mandate from Ashcroft, who
attributes the "sidewalk" reference to Robert Kennedy in his pursuit of organized crime). But see
id. (quoting officials who served under Kennedy in the Justice Department as arguing that
Kennedy did not seek the broad power that Ashcroft has claimed).
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groups.10 6  The government expressly declined to specify how and why
such information might be of assistance to terrorists or to engage in a case-
by-case showing of the need for non-disclosure because such a showing
would itself aid terrorists.1
0 7
In the law of criminal procedure, the most troubling retreat from
particularity has occurred in case called United States v. Awadallah.08 In
Awadallah, the government discovered Awadallah's phone number in the
trunk of a car left at Dulles Airport in Virginia by one of the September 11
hijackers. 0 9 The government did not contest on appeal that the federal
agents illegally seized Awadallah both times they spoke with him."1
0
Considering whether any means less restrictive than detention was
"impracticable" for securing Awadallah's testimony before a grand jury, the
Second Circuit was not disturbed that the government's affidavit supporting
its application for an arrest warrant failed to disclose a number of facts."'
106. Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 924, 928-929 (upholding government's refusal
to disclose information); cf id. at 940 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (criticizing "government's vague,
poorly explained allegations" and asserting that majority, "by filling in the gaps in the
government's case with its own assumptions about facts absent from the record," has "converted
deference into acquiescence"); Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15, at 400-01 (criticizing
majority's holding as example of dangers of undue deference to executive).
107. CenterforNat'lSec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928-929.
108. 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861 (2005).
109. Id. at 45. Agents seized Awadallah, a Jordanian national, in the period immediately after
September 11, and questioned him for six hours at the FBI's office. Id. at 46. After this
questioning, the FBI sought a warrant to hold Awadallah as a material witness. Id. at 47. The
affidavit attested to Awadallah's acquaintance with two of the hijackers, his interest in Osama bin
Laden, and his ownership of a "box-cutter," but left other relevant information and contained no
further information linking Awadallah to the September 11 conspiracy. Id. By the end of his
detention as a material witness, Awadallah "had bruises on his upper arms," and an agent's report
indicated other injuries involving his shoulder, ankles, hand, and face. Id. at 48.
Before the grand jury, Awadallah testified that he did not know the name of one of the
hijackers and that writing in a booklet obtained from his English professor was not his.
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 48. In a second appearance before the grand jury, Awadallah
acknowledged that the writing was his, and that he recalled the name of the hijacker. Id. The
government indicted him for making false statements to the grand jury. Id. Awadallah moved to
dismiss the indictment and suppress the statements to the grand jury, as well as other evidence
obtained from his home and cars. Id. The district court denied the defendant's motion but
dismissed the indictment and suppressed the evidence after a hearing and briefing on two issues
raised sua sponte by the court. Id. at 48-49.
110. Id. at 68-69; see also United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 101-05 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("Awadallah I') (holding that government's initial contact with Awadallah constituted a
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment), rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 861 (2005).
111. See Awadallah 1H, 349 F.3d at 70; see also id. at 76 (Straub, J., concurring in the
judgment on separate grounds) (arguing that once the illegally seized evidence was removed from
the affidavit, there was no "probable cause to believe that it may have 'become impracticable' to
secure Awadallah's presence before the grand jury by subpoena").
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For example, the affidavit did not disclose that Awadallah had not seen one
of the hijackers for over a year, had moved eighteen months earlier from the
address associated with the phone number found in the trunk of the
hijacker's car, and had used a "box-cutter" found by agents in his car to
install a new carpet in his apartment. 12 Nor did the affidavit disclose that
Awadallah had been "cooperative" after his concededly illegal seizure by
the FBI, and that he had three brothers in San Francisco, including one who
was an American citizen. 1 3 Discounting the impact of these omissions by
the government, the Second Circuit cited the fact that Awadallah had failed
to come forward voluntarily after the attacks to disclose his acquaintance
with two of the hijackers.' 1 4
The Second Circuit's holding that Awadallah's mere failure to come
forward was a sufficient factual predicate for his detention as a material
witness sets a distressingly low threshold of particularity. Although the law
may require that persons approached by law enforcement not affirmatively
misrepresent facts, mandating that people come forward is a departure from
well-established Anglo-American legal norms. Our basic liberties include
the freedom not to speak or act; thus, there is no generalized duty to rescue
others or volunteer to assist the government.' 15 Without such norms, the
government could detain or prosecute persons who failed to come forward
with information about any offense. 1 6 The amorphous nature of the failure
to come forward would invite governmental reliance on invidious criteria,
such as race, ethnicity, or political belief, in selecting targets.
In Awadallah, the government's disregard of such concerns raised the
specter of informational overreaching. The government offered no
evidence that Awadallah failed to come forward because of an urge to
mislead law enforcement or flee the jurisdiction. Indeed, Awadallah's
failure to come forward may have stemmed from his desire to avoid the
marathon interrogation by the government that ensued after his seizure-an
interrogation which in conjunction with his subsequent detention produced
112. Id. at47.
113. Id.
114. Awadallah 11, 349 F.3d at 70.
115. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmts. f, g (1965) (noting the lack of a duty
to rescue under the common law); cf Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the
"Hand Formula," 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 145, 237-38 (2003) (discussing roots of rejection of
general duty to rescue in conception of freedom).
116. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 106-11 (2004) [hereinafter ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD] (discussing perils in
government attempts to use technology to monitor population for terrorist threats); cf Linda E.
Fisher, Guilt By Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of
Groups, 46 ARIz. L. REv. 621 (2004) (outlining dangers of government surveillance of political
and religious groups after September 11).
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virtually no information of use regarding the hijackers. Given Awadallah's
lack of useful information, the court's mention of "the terrorist attacks
known to everyone else on the planet, and the implicit threat of future
attacks,""' 7 seems at best a non sequitur, and at worst an invocation of fear
as a substitute for analysis.
Viewed in retrospect, the government's detention of Awadallah for
almost three weeks as a material witness seems designed more to produce
some "hook" for prosecuting him further, despite the absence of any
information linking him to the planning or execution of the September 11
attacks. Nor does the court adequately analyze why the government failed
to include facts demonstrating that Awadallah was not likely to flee because
of community and family ties, or why Awadallah's responses to questioning
by the government prior to his detention did not constitute "cooperation"
within the meaning of the material witness statute.
To illustrate the currency of these concerns about the erosion of
particularity, consider the recent case of Brandon Mayfield, a lawyer in
Portland whom the FBI arrested in May 2004 as a material witness in
connection with the Madrid train bombing." 8 The FBI secured a warrant
for Mayfield's arrest apparently without disclosing that Spanish authorities
had grave doubts about the fingerprint match between Mayfield and a print
found at the scene of the bombing.' 9 Central to the FBI's affidavit were
allegations that Mayfield had represented an individual in a child custody
case who was subsequently charged in a terrorism investigation, had called
the head of a local Islamic organization, and had visited a mosque. 20 Based
on this ill-fitting mosaic, the government held Mayfield for seventeen days
until it was forced to acknowledge that the fingerprints did not match.'
2
'
Failures of disclosure by government in such cases encourage the
detention of persons whose only offenses are displaying indicia of religious
commitment or fleeting, innocent, or privileged association with
wrongdoers. In an ongoing crisis, it is understandable that government may
desire such authority. However, courts should not rush to indulge executive
branch appetites that undermine the integrity of procedural safeguards. 1
22
117. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70.
118. See Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Spain Had Doubts Before U.S. Held Lawyer in
Blast, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at Al.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. This is the gravamen of the recent Supreme Court decisions. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.
Ct. 2686 (2004) (finding federal jurisdiction regarding petitions of alleged al Qaeda detainees at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (requiring procedural
protections for alleged enemy combatants).
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B. Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence
The Koubriti case illustrates how extrajudicial comments by
prosecutors interact with other forms of informational overreaching, such as
the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Moreover, such failures feed
back into our first species of informational overreaching-the erosion of
particularity. Withholding exculpatory evidence in terrorism cases weakens
the particularity requirement by allowing the government to exploit
inappropriate inferences based on widely held views that a defendant with a
particular ethnic or religious background. is more likely to have committed
the acts charged.123 Without the distraction of facts that might counter such
inferences, prosecutors seeking conviction need only contend with the
dutiful but bland instructions offered by the trial judge.124 Here, too, history
offers troubling precedents.
In the World War I prosecutions, for example, the government
systematically failed to reveal evidence that the dissidents charged had no
knowledge of any treasonable plots against the government. 25  In the
Rosenberg case, the government concealed evidence that would have at
least partially exculpated Ethel Rosenberg, revealing her as at best a tacit
ally in the espionage conspiracy charged, not an active or even fully
knowing participant.1
26
More recent cases also reveal the troubling synthesis of hyperbolic
public comments with back-stage withholding of information. Consider the
case of Edwin Wilson, a CIA operative convicted of trafficking in arms on
behalf of Libya. 27 Prosecutors were able to frame the debate by a publicity
campaign that framed Wilson as a rogue agent.128 A recent court decision,
however, demonstrates that Wilson may have had government authorization
for many of his allegedly criminal activities, and the government may have
willfully deceived the court by saying otherwise. 29  Another notable
example is New York's infamous "Central Park Jogger" case, in which the
prosecution, determined to respond to the public outcry about a brutal rape,
123. See Alimad, supra note 102, at 104; Akram & Johnson, supra note 102, at 301.
124. Cf Alschuler, supra note 29, at 652-53 (expressing skepticism about curative power of
instructions by trial judges).
125. See MURPHY, supra note 25, at 107.
126. See Parrish, supra note 27, at 602. Consider also the government's failure to
acknowledge in all but a handful of cases involving the internment of Japanese-Americans that the
government possessed no information whatsoever indicating the participation of the detainees in
sabotage or espionage. See Gudridge, supra note 101, at 1940.
127. United States v. Wilson, 289 F. Supp. 2d 801, 803 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 807-08.
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ignored pervasive and material inconsistencies in the alleged "confessions"
of the defendants.' 30  The defendants' status as young African-Americans
accused of "wilding" in Central Park made them handy scapegoats for the
crime, contributing to the rush to judgment.131
In the post-9/11 era, the government failed to disclose significant
evidence about its chief witness in the Koubriti case. 132 After the trial, the
prosecutor in the case provided the defense with a letter, received before the
trial, from a federal prisoner stating that the government's main witness
admitted that he had fabricated his story about the defendants. 33  The
government defended its failure to disclose the letter previously, arguing
that it was not material.' 34 The court ordered a new trial for the document
fraud charges. 1
35
The government's failure to make exculpatory evidence available after
September 11 has also played a prominent role in the case of accused
"twentieth hijacker," Zacarias Moussaoui. 136  In Moussaoui, the Fourth
Circuit overruled the district court's ruling and held that the government's
failure to produce detainees with exculpatory information for a video
deposition would not unduly prejudice the defendant' 37  The Fourth
Circuit's decision forces the defendant in a capital case to rely on the
impersonal and possibly unreliable summaries of the reports of the
detainee's interrogation prepared by government officials.1
38
130. New York v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d 837, 845-46 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (also noting discovery of
new DNA evidence demonstrating that another individual had committed the crime in question).
131. See N.R. Kleinfeld, A Crime Revisited: Voices; City Reminded of Fears It Believed It Left
Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at B5.
132. United States v. Koubriti, 297 F. Supp. 2d 955, 958 (E.D. Mich. 2004) ("Koubriti F').
133. Id. at 959-60.
134. Id. at 960. The government has asserted that other allegations in the letter, including the
claim that the Bush family is in league with international drug traffickers, would have
substantially eroded the credibility of the letter's author before a jury. See Norman Sinclair, Fed
Missteps Jeopardized Terror Case, DETROIT NEWS, March 28, 2004, at Al. While this is a
plausible assertion viewed in isolation, it begs the question of why the government did not allow
the defense to make its own decision about the probative force of the evidence.
135. Koubriti IV, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
136. Moussaoui IV, 382 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385).
137. Id. at 478. For the district court's considered opinion, see Moussaoui 111, 282 F. Supp. 2d
480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003) (striking government's notice of intent to seek death penalty, dismissing
several charges, and precluding prosecution's introduction of evidence relating to events of
September 11 in case of alleged "twentieth hijacker"), afd in part, vacated in part, 382 F.3d 453
(4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385); cf
Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15, at 436 (praising district court's ruling in Moussaoui,
while arguing that it does not go far enough in eradicating prejudice to defendant because
testimony barred by the government could also have been exculpatory on remaining counts).
138. The district court found that the summaries were unreliable. Moussaoui IV, 382 F.3d at
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Because it concerns the only domestic case involving a defendant with
alleged ties to the September I I attacks, the problems with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Moussaoui are worth examining in depth. Although
the decision acknowledges that the government cannot bar access to
evidence with complete impunity,139 the analysis and remedies offered by
the Fourth Circuit severely discount the prejudice to the defendant, defer
excessively to the blanket national security arguments of the executive, and
distort the balancing test provided by analogy to the Classified Information
Procedures Act ("CIPA").140
First, reliance on the summaries prepared by the government as a
substitute for the video deposition ordered by the district court precludes the
defendant's lawyers from developing further exculpatory information that
the give and take of a deposition would reveal. 14' A deposition of the
detainee, presumably Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an alleged al Qaeda ringleader
captured in Pakistan, might point the defendant to other witnesses or
documentary evidence. The government may have failed to uncover such
evidence in the course of its interrogation, may have unduly discounted its
importance to the defense, or may simply have determined that it would not
be in the government's interest to volunteer additional information. A
deposition of the detainee would guard against any of these risks.
Second, the format of the summaries, however the court and the parties
edit them through the uncertain process outlined by the Fourth Circuit, may
well substantially reduce the impact of the exculpatory evidence contained
therein on the finder of fact, sow jury confusion, and even produce
heightened prejudice to the defense. The summaries, akin to stipulations
entered into by both parties, lack the enlivening interchange featured in
actual testimony. The dramatic, narrative elements of testimony make it
memorable for juries, who may find the mechanical recitation of
478 (discussing district court's rulings in the case, some of which are unavailable through Lexis,
apparently because of the national security information contained therein). The Fourth Circuit
found that the summaries were reliable, but again, in part presumably for national security
reasons, its analysis of this issue in the published decision is conclusory at best. Id.
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Moussaoui, it issued an order requiring the
government to explain "arguably inconsistent" information in the government's filings that
suggested that prosecutors may have had some contact with personnel interrogating the alleged al
Qaeda detainees. Jerry Markon, Court Questions Al Qaeda Contact; Moussaoui Case Could Stall
Again, WASH. POST, May 15, 2004, at A3. The ambiguity surrounding the nature of the
prosecutors' involvement in the interrogation brings home the artificiality of the Fourth Circuit's
distinction between the prosecutors and the U.S. agencies with custody of the detainees.
139. Moussaoui IV, 382 F.3d at 476.
140. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 6.
141. The use of summaries of classified documents is a device provided for under CIPA. See
infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in the Fourth Circuit's use of CIPA).
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stipulations soporific. As the Supreme Court noted in Old Chief v. United
States,142 while discussing the advantages of testimony over stipulations,
143
"A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be
no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it.
144
Furthermore, a jury, accustomed by popular culture and the routine of the
trial to seeing evidence from particular individuals in the form of testimony,
may be confused by the disruption of their expectations. 45  Reacting as
people typically do, they may well direct blame for their confusion at the
party introducing the evidence146-here, the defendant. Lacking access to
exculpatory evidence in a compelling form, and blaming the defendant for
confounding their expectations, a jury may find it easier to convict.
Furthermore, the government's argument that making this witness
available would disrupt his interrogation should not outweigh the prejudice
to Moussaoui. 147  Rather than accepting the government's blanket
justification for denying a defendant access to detainees, the court could
have engaged in a more textured analysis. Under this analysis, a court
could acknowledge that the government has a legitimate interest in
interrogating al Qaeda detainees about future operations. Over time,
however, that justification grows less compelling, as detainees either reveal
information or demonstrate definitive resiliency in declining to do so.
148
Here, bin al-Shibh had been in custody for approximately eighteen months
142. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
143. Cf Richman, Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability, supra note 72.
144. Old Chief 519 U.S. at 189; cf ROSEN, supra note 116, at 75 (noting that people often
make "affective judgments" based on "images, metaphors, and narratives"); Matthew Rabin,
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 30-31 (1998) (discussing importance of salience
in human inference); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 80, 706-07 (analyzing how cognitively salient
factors play a disproportionate role in public policy).
145. OldChief 519 U.S. at 188-89.
146. Id.
147. See Moussaoui IV, 382 F.3d at 470
148. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 186 (2003) (holding that government's interest in
restoring criminal defendants to competence through the administration of psychotropic
medication declines when the time taken to restore competence will exceed the maximum
sentence the defendant could serve for the offense charged); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
701 (2001) (holding that government cannot detain aliens already subject to final deportation
order for more than six months without reasonable prospect of securing cooperation of alien's
country of origin or other country in effecting alien's deportation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 738 (1972) (holding that state must dismiss criminal charges against defendants who have no
reasonable prospect for attaining competence to stand trial); cf Brief of Amicus Curiae, Center for
Nat'l Security Studies at 8 n.1, Moussaoui IV, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4792):
The government's national security interest in this case rests upon showing that a deposition
of the detainees would be likely to cause them to refuse to disclose information important to
national security that they would otherwise disclose. Such a showing might be difficult in
this case, where the detainees have been in captivity for several months and have already
reportedly disclosed important information.
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and had already been talking to the government. 149 It is doubtful that brief
and carefully circumscribed contact with officers of the court will
necessarily imperil his transmission of future information.15
0
Finally, the Fourth Circuit presses its analogy to CIPA too far. As the
district court noted, CIPA provides a balancing test that can be very helpful
in analyzing the novel issues raised in Moussaoui, allowing the court to
weigh the defendant's interest in an effective defense against the
government's interest in avoiding disclosure of information that could
endanger sources and methods of intelligence collection. 151  However,
CIPA's lack of direct application to the case is not fortuitous, but instead is
bound up with the merits of the dispute. CIPA only addresses disclosure of
information to the public.152 The pre-trial deposition at issue in Moussaoui
does not on its face involve public disclosure since all parties to the
deposition, including the experienced federal public defenders representing
Moussaoui, have affirmed their obligation to refrain from such disclosure
pending trial. Under CIPA, the government's interest does not crystallize
until trial when the parties and the court can apply the balancing test to
149. David Johnson & Don Van Natta Jr., Threats and Responses: The Interrogations;
Account of Plot Sets Off Debate Over Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at Al.
150. The government has also asserted the disruption of interrogation argument in Padilla ex
rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, 352
F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), a case involving the detention of an
alleged unlawful combatant currently in Pentagon custody. In Padilla, the district court observed
that the government's uncontested control over a detainee might harden attitudes, while an outside
actor such as an attorney who has contact with the detainee might actually facilitate cooperation,
as attorneys do routinely in criminal cases. Id. at 52 (noting that providing counsel to Padilla
might, as with many criminal defendants facing trial, promote a realistic perspective, leading the
defendant to "seek to better his lot by cooperating"). The government has acknowledged that
other detainees providing evidence against Padilla have offered much "misinformation" to
interrogators. See Steve Fainaru, Padilla 's Al Qaeda Ties Confirmed, Prosecutors Say, WASH.
POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at A4 (quoting government as acknowledging that "some of the sources who
provided information on Padilla may be trying to mislead the government"). However, the
government has argued against allowing Padilla a day in court to contest those allegations, and has
declined to provide Padilla's lawyer with any examples of the misinformation supplied by
Padilla's accusers. See id. For a discussion of the difficult issues posed by detention of alleged
unlawful combatants, see Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15, at 417-18 (arguing for
procedural safeguards for detention); cf Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2003) (discussing challenge to criminal justice
system posed by individuals like Moussaoui, whose intractable beliefs and acknowledged
commitment to violent means for realizing those beliefs may make them "undeterrable").
151. Moussaoui I, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003),
appeal dismissed by 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003).
152. See Moussaoui II, 333 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that CIPA did not
directly apply to Moussaoui's case and dismissing the government's interlocutory appeal from the
preliminary order of the district court).
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determine the content and format of the evidence presented.'53 Before trial,
court orders and affirmations by the lawyers involved in the case can deal
adequately with the risk of disclosure to the public.
The Fourth Circuit failed to acknowledge that the lower risk of public
disclosure in the pre-trial stage in Moussaoui makes the government's
interest in avoiding a video deposition less compelling than the interest that
CIPA was designed to protect. The prejudice to the defendant, however,
remains constant since the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to use
the deposition to develop other evidence that might be admissible at trial.
Taking the possibility of prejudice seriously, the Fourth Circuit should have
upheld the district court's more robust remedy: dismissal of a number of the
charges against Moussaoui, suppression of the government's evidence
purporting to link Moussaoui to the September 11 attacks, and striking of
the government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 54
C. Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence
The government has also sought to control information to a different
audience-the public and prospective jurors-through extrajudicial
comments regarding terrorism prosecutions. Prejudicial public comments
by prosecutors are a staple of government reactions to crisis. When the
public and media identify one group as the source of the crisis, such
comments can drive perceptions about all defendants from that group,
thereby making the government's job easier at trial and further eroding
safeguards such as the reasonable doubt standard. Extrajudicial comments
by the Attorney General can also discourage internal criticism and the
disclosure of information to the defense inconsistent with the theme
sounded in public. Ashcroft had resorted to this tactic, in keeping with
precedent from past crises. These precedents are not encouraging.' 55 In
World War I, for example, the Wilson Administration mounted a
sophisticated propaganda campaign led by George Creel, a public relations
executive, to discredit dissenters such as Eugene V. Debs and inflame
153. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing CIPA process
for providing substitutions for documents at trial and upholding use of substitutions where "[n]o
information was omitted from the substitutions that might have been helpful to [the] defense, and
the discoverable documents had no unclassified features that might have been disclosed to [the
defendant]").
154. Moussaoui III, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), afld in part, vacated in part,
382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385).
155. See DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 28 (discussing the history of government abuse of
civil liberties during crises).
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public opinion against them.156  Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory,
Palmer's predecessor, joined in this effort, warning dissenters, "May God
have mercy on them, for they need expect none from an outraged people
and an avenging government."' 57 Gregory described the "male pacifist [a]s
a 'physical, or moral degenerate"" 58 and vigorously endorsed a state bar
association resolution that condemned as "unpatriotic and unprofessional" a
lawyer's representation of an objector to the draft. 159 Line prosecutors and
juries needed little urging to "get with the program,"'160 drawing inferences
on culpability of the accused for sedition and espionage based on the mere
fact of their dissent from the war effort.
The record in the McCarthy era after World War II is hardly better. In
the Rosenberg "atom-spy" trial, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath and
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover issued a press release that set the stage for
massive and often inaccurate reporting about the case in the media.' 6' The
lead prosecutor in the case, Irving Saypol, assisted by the politically
connected Roy Cohn, who subsequently became chief counsel to Sen.
Joseph McCarthy's committee, 162 capitalized on his agenda-setting ability
by holding informal press conferences after the conclusion of the day's
events in the courtroom.' 63 The prosecution's efforts to inflame both the
public and the jury through inappropriate publicity continued throughout
the trial.' 64 While the Second Circuit criticized Saypol for engaging in
156. See Stone, supra note 98, at 413-14.
157. Id. at 413. Attorney General Gregory, in contrast with Ashcroft, subsequently became
more reflective about the authority he had claimed. See id. at 442 & n.123. However, his initial
pronouncements, coupled with those of other Administration figures as well as officials at the
state level and leaders of organizations, set in motion a cascade of law enforcement activity
against dissidents. Id.
158. See MURPHY, supra note 25, at 192.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 191 (noting that "United States Attorneys [were] eager to prosecute vigorously
under [restrictive wartime] legislation and anxious to secure convictions from juries").
161. See Attossa M. Alavi, Comment, The Government Against Two: Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg's Trial, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1057, 1068 (2003).
162. Id. at 1060 & n.13.
163. Id. at 1067.
164. See id. at 1068. In his most egregious act of overreaching, during the trial Saypol
announced the perjury indictment of an alleged associate of the Rosenbergs, William PerI. Id.
Saypol explained to the media, in accounts that the jury, which was not sequestered, most
probably read, that Perl was to have testified in the Rosenberg trial to corroborate a government
witness. Id. at 1068-69. The implication, which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals later
described as part of a "reprehensible" course of conduct on Saypol's part, was that other
confederates of the Rosenbergs had "gotten to" Perl, causing him to lie to the grand jury
investigating the case. See United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1952). This
kind of discussion of potential witnesses, augmented by the prosecution's gambit of placing
distinguished scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer, developer of the atom bomb, on the witness
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excessive public comments, 165 the anti-Communist hysteria of the period
made such reputational sanctions largely irrelevant.
Public comments by Ashcroft in the two years after September 11
converged with a general ratcheting up of prosecutors' public description of
terrorism cases. Every indictment involves not merely alleged wrongdoing,
but a new terrorist "cell" set to perpetrate the next September 11. When
qualifications of this rhetoric occur, they occur most often after
announcement of an indictment, and indeed after defendants have gone to
trial or taken a plea. At sentencing, prosecutors suddenly discover that
yesterday's vast terrorist conspiracy is actually a more modest bundle of
conduct, much of which would not even have been illegal prior to 1996.
To consider the current dangers of public comments by prosecutors,
consider United States v. Koubriti, a Detroit case in which the government
charged the defendants with "material support" of terrorist activity. 166 The
defendants were initially arrested in the weeks after September 11 because
they occupied an apartment once rented by an individual whom the
government was seeking in connection with ties to al Qaeda. 167  The
defendants were allegedly in possession of a substantial number of
fraudulent immigration documents not solely for their own use, as well as a
diagram of a United States military base in Turkey.
168
The government's main -witness tying these disparate pieces together
was a gentleman named Yousef Hminmsa.' 69  Hmimmsa was in many
ways the prototype of an individual apprehended by the government in the
course of clearly illegal behavior-here, the fabrication and sale of
fraudulent government documents-who had powerful incentives to offer
the government something, anything, that might shift blame from him to
others. 170 Hmimmsa alleged that the defendants in Koubriti had knowingly
assisted "various terrorism-related activities."17'
list to buttress the scientific basis for the government's case, was part of a strategy for influencing
both the public and the jury. See Alavi, supra note 129, at 1069-70. The defense, perhaps
persuaded by Saypol's avowals that he had not sought to influence the jury, did not ask for a
mistrial. Id. at 1069.
165. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d at 670 ("Such ... tactics cannot be too severely condemned.").
166. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
167. Id. at 727-28.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 734.
170. For more on the dynamics of informers and false testimony, see Weinstein, Regulating
the Market in Snitches, supra note 71, at 599-600; Margulies, Battered Bargaining, supra note 18,
at 167 n.48.
171. Koubriti I, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 734. At trial, the jury convicted two of the defendants of
document fraud and terrorism-related offenses, one was convicted of document fraud, and one was
acquitted. Id. at 736.
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The Koubriti case revealed a pattern of public comments by senior
officials that both violated a court order and entailed a substantial risk of
prejudice to the defense. The judge in the case entered a gag order shortly
after the arraignment, concerned about the prejudicial nature of publicity
after September 11.172 In the weeks after September 11, Ashcroft asserted
without any support that the defendants had advance knowledge of the
September 1 1 attacks. 173 Conferences with the judge followed, after which
a senior government official stated that "no further such incidents would
occur during the case. 174  The government then retracted these
assertions, 175 although the retraction received less press coverage than the
initial statements by Ashcroft. However, the day before the prosecutors
filed a revised indictment a television network reported on the forthcoming
indictment, which circumstances suggested was a leak from a law
enforcement official. 176 The court again insisted that the government obey
its gag order but did not sanction anyone. 1
77
After the trial itself commenced, Ashcroft commented directly on the
evidence, praising Hmimmsa as providing testimony of "substantial value"
to prosecutors. 178  Ashcroft made his comments after a particularly
damaging cross-examination of Hmimmsa by defense counsel. 179 Ashcroft
also described the defendants as being part of a terrorist "cell," without
using the usual qualifier "alleged."' 80
Ashcroft's comments in the Koubriti case demonstrate the connection
between inappropriate publicity and the erosion of particularity. The
prosecution had to persuade the jury to draw damaging inferences against
the defendants on the basis of activity that was either innocuous, such as the
possession of a videotape of tourist attractions,' 81 or explainable without
reference to terrorism,182 such as the possession of fraudulent immigration
documents. The Arab and Muslim background of the defendants provided
an unspoken, albeit invidious, link between the innocuous or otherwise
172. Id. at 725.
173. Id. at 729-30. One defense lawyer violated the ban by publicly criticizing the
government's witness, Hmimmsa, as a "snitch." He subsequently left the case. Id. at 732 & n.8.
174. Id. at 730.
175. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
176. Id. at 731-32.
177. Id. at 733.
178. Id. at 735.
179. See id. at 734-35.
180. Id. at 735.
181. See Liptak, supra note 104.
182. Koubriti 11, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 727-28.
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explainable behavior and the government's charges.' 83 Publicly describing
the defendants as members of a terrorist "cell" made it easier to make that
link, while camouflaging its malevolent origin. 184 Bolstering the credibility
of the government's flawed chief witness also gave members of the public
and the jury, who might have been wary of drawing forbidden inferences,
something more neutral on which to hang their hats.
Koubriti also demonstrates the inadequacies of the relational approach
in times of crisis. After the judge indicated that he was considering the
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate whether Ashcroft
should be charged with criminal contempt, Ashcroft sent the judge a written
apology. 185  Ashcroft described his public comments about the
government's witness in guarded, lawyerly terms, acknowledging that the
"statements, however brief and passing,. . . could have been considered...
to be a breach of . . . the Court's Order."' 186 He further described his
remarks as "inadvertent" comments resulting from ill-informed drafting on
the part of his staff.
187
Applying the relational approach, the court admonished Ashcroft for
violating the court's order, but decided against further fact-finding
regarding possible contempt charges. 88  However, the court failed to
address the interaction between Ashcroft's public vouching for the
government's witness, and the prosecution's failure to hand over documents
challenging that witness's account. The court also failed to recognize that
the form and content of Ashcroft's apology raised far more questions than
answers. For example, his blaming of his staff for failing to draft his
remarks properly represents a striking abdication of accountability.'
89
Whatever his staff's role, surely a U.S. Attorney General should
acknowledge personal responsibility for public remarks, awareness of
outstanding court orders, and knowledge of professional rules and
departmental regulations that limit extrajudicial comments. Delegating
responsibility for such matters to staff signals difficulties within the
institution that transcend the remedial capabilities of the relational
paradigm.
183. See Liptak, supra note 104.
184. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
185. Id. at 737.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 737-38.
188. Id. at 753.
189. Id. at 738.
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D. Summary
In times of crisis, informational overreaching by the government takes
three interlocking forms. First, the government seeks to avoid the
requirement that it show a particularized need for coercion or restraint.
Second, government seeks to limit its obligation to share with the defense
exculpatory evidence. Third, while minimizing access to information by
the defendants, the courts, and the public, government officials make public
statements that create a prejudicial atmosphere pending or during trial.
These moves create a dynamic of monolithic prosecution that threatens
fairness and accountability.
IV. AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO INFORMATIONAL OVERREACHING
Once informational overreaching gains momentum, it is very difficult
to stop. 19° Narratives of exigency are notoriously difficult to question or
rebut. 91 Courts that wish to deter informational overreaching in a period of
crisis must act as counterweights to prosecutorial power. The requisite
authority, while embedded in judicial tradition, involves an institutional
turn more far-reaching than the reassuring informality of the relational
approach.
The institutional approach would draw dn the public law tradition of
federal remedies, under which federal courts undertook reform of state and
local institutions such as jails and psychiatric hospitals. 192 It would braid
this remedial strand together with the remedial element of constitutional
criminal procedure, under which the courts have for decades fashioned rules
for compliance with the Due Process Clause and with the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments by prosecutors and law enforcement officials. 193 Each
remedial tradition is both fluid-capable of adapting to shifting demands-
and focused---capable of providing concrete guidance to multiple
190. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 80, at 713 (discussing force of policy "cascades" that
develop from interaction of entrepreneurship and public fears).
191. See ROSEN, supra note 116, at 75 (discussing belief perseverance in psychology of fear);
Gross, supra note 81, at 1038-42 (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst
Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 77 (2002) (same).
192. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 55, at 13; Sabel & Simon, supra note 30, at 1016-17;
cf Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15, at 402 (discussing institutional approach based on
remedies jurisprudence for dealing with issues such as detention of alleged "unlawful
combatants"). But see Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 113-17 (2003) (critiquing public law remedies as
unduly disrupting the political branches); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New
Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 29-30 (2003) (discussing dangers of overstepping judicial role
in supervision of mass tort litigation).
193. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
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constituencies. To appreciate the flexibility of equitable remedies, consider
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 194 in which the Supreme Court noted that:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to
do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private
needs .... 195
Yet, while equitable jurisdiction is fluid, it can also be concrete when
necessary. In certain situations, courts dealing with the "polycentric" pull
of different constituencies have, after extensive fact-finding, determined
that broad standards give institutions too much room to frustrate needed
reforms.' 196  In such cases, courts have issued detailed orders ordering
changes in institutions such as public employers, schools, and prisons.
197
The remedial authority of federal courts in the domain of criminal
procedure has followed a similar path. 198 Prior to the plenary incorporation
of Bill of Rights guarantees, federal courts reviewing the fairness of
criminal convictions in state courts applied the Due Process Clause in a
fashion that was fluid, "duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of
continuity and of change in a progressive society.'199 Reflecting this fluid
approach, the Court excluded evidence obtained by means that "shock[ ] the
,conscience."200 By the same token, when such open-textured tests provide
insufficient guidance, the Court has not hesitated to require more concrete
steps as a prophylactic measure. The Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, for example, which required specific warnings to defendants in
custody regarding their .right to remain silent and consult with counsel,
implemented a concrete regime. 20 1 This was in response to the apparent
tendency of law enforcement officials to cut comers in adhering to the more
194. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
195. Id. at 329-30; see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 192, at 194-95 (praising
exercise of equitable discretion in Hecht); cf TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1978) (holding
that Endangered Species Act abrogated equitable jurisdiction, requiring issuance of injunction
against construction of dam to save the endangered snail darter fish).
196. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
197. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 55, at 13; Sabel & Simon, supra note 30, at 1029-33
(discussing interaction between fluidity and specificity in judicial decrees addressing institutional
problems in mental health system).
198. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45; cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)
(re-affirming Miranda's viability as constitutional precedent).
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amorphous "totality of the circumstances" test then applied to the
assessment of voluntariness in defendant's confessions.2 °2
The balance between flexibility and formality, in both the equitable and
criminal procedure realms, often hinged expressly or impliedly on the
likelihood that the government would overreach against particular
subordinated groups. The equitable public law remedies cases often
involved litigation where plaintiffs were people of color, such as the
plaintiffs in the school desegregation, or child welfare cases, 203 or people of
limited means, such as the residents of public psychiatric facilities, prisons,
and jails.20 4 Further, in the criminal procedure context, the Supreme Court
has noted the special vulnerability to abusive law enforcement practices of
people of color.20 5
An institutional perspective is necessary because the remedies typical
of the relational approach cannot cope effectively with the external
pressures and signaling by senior officials typical of the monolithic turn.
While judges can effectively use reputation sanctions with prosecutors,
such informal measures are far less effective in dealing with the behavior of
senior officials, whose reputations hinge on the responses of an audience
that extends well beyond the dimensions of the courtroom. The Attorney
General, for example, is a political appointee with a far wider constituency
than a prosecutor; the Attorney General's decisions deal more with shaping
and satisfying the demands of national political constituencies. When the
Attorney General can appeal to these constituencies for validation, mere
unfavorable words from a court will not be a significant deterrent.20 6
An institutional approach is also crucial because of the interlocking
character of the three brands of informational overreaching by prosecutors
in terrorism cases. An institutional approach, rather than considering
prosecutors as isolated legal actors and analyzing prosecutorial misconduct
within discrete doctrinal pigeonholes, would recognize the links between
the erosion of particularity, the failure to disclose exculpatory information
to the defense, and excessive extrajudicial comments about pending cases.
Each component of informational overreaching reinforces the others,
202. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
203. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf NINA BERNSTEIN, The LOST
CHILDREN OF WILDER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CHANGE FOSTER CARE 59-60 (2001) (discussing
racial disparities in foster care).
204. FEELEY& RUBIN, supra note 55, at 13.
205. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 (noting police abuse of Latinos and African-Americans); cf
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (discussing concerns about police targeting of
people of color as rationale for development of "void for vagueness" doctrine).
206. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing role of "authenticity
entrepreneurs").
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making prosecutors less accountable and impairing the integrity of the
justice system. The courts should interpret their remedial power to promote
accountability and integrity. °7 To that end, the institutional approach
would construe misrepresentation, prejudice, and bad faith in structural
terms, and tailor remedies accordingly. Only an institutional perspective
can re-frame the discourse and ex ante incentives of prosecutors in times of
crisis.
A. Preserving Particularity
One of the first casualties of a national security crisis is the principle
that the government must provide courts with a particularized basis for
searches, seizures, or detentions. In a crisis, requiring particularity as a
predicate for governmental intrusion or coercion may seem quaint or even
perverse. For a democracy, however, viewing particularity as an exercise in
nostalgia threatens abiding values that exigency should not extinguish.
Courts serve those values by preserving some meaningful threshold of
particularity as a safeguard against the evils of monolithic prosecution.
Finding the right balance of particularity and exigency is crucial.2 °8
Traditional standards of reasonableness have always contemplated some
trade-off between the probability and gravity of harm. A showing that
serious harm is possible in the near or foreseeable future will heighten
requirements of due care for private actors charged with preventing harm,
or grant government greater flexibility in law enforcement.20 9 For example,
207. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004) (holding that federal jurisdiction under
habeas statute extended to consideration of cases of detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base).
208. See Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15; Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 35, at 955.
209. Judge Learned Hand indicated that under the law of torts reasonableness might require a
heightened standard of care when lack of due care could cause an injury of sufficient gravity,
despite a lower probability that the injury would in fact occur. See United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); cf Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 556 (3d
Cir. 2001) (observing that the government, when making a decision to apprehend an individual
suspected of plotting terrorist activity-in that case a pre-September 11 plan to bomb the World
Trade Center-was entitled to consider not only the probability that an individual had engaged in
such activity, but also the extent of the destruction that could have resulted); see also ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE
CHALLENGE 187-96 (2002) (discussing constitutional concern with false positives, while arguing
that the challenge of terrorism complicates issue); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Fury: Why
Congress Must Curb Bush's Military Courts, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 20
(arguing that public interest requires some revision of balance between false positives and false
negatives when persons who turn out to be false negatives "slaughter innocent civilians, and may
well have access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons"). But see Ronald Dworkin, The
Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44, 44 (cautioning against lowering
standards of proof in terrorism cases brought in courts, military tribunals, or other venues);
Wright, supra note 115 (critiquing Hand formula).
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courts have suggested that a more modest showing of probable cause than
the usual might govern law enforcement officers' search to discover a
ticking bomb2 '0 and that the failure to give Miranda warnings would not
compel the suppression of a defendant's statements made under
interrogation in a situation posing an imminent danger to the officers'*
safety.21 Similarly, one could argue that government investigators in the
period immediately proceeding September 11 were unduly reticent in
seeking a warrant for the laptop of the frustrated flight school enrollee
Zacarias Moussaoui, given the available evidence that al Qaeda was
considering using airplanes as bombs.212
Fine-tuning the balance between particularity and exigency should not
lead to the demise of the particularity requirement. It appears that in cases
since September 11, courts have sometimes contorted logic to dispense with
particularity. Courts need to be especially wary that they are not distorting
doctrine to accomplish a particular result, such as ensuring the admissibility
of evidence that should be excluded. This result-oriented jurisprudence has
made troubling inroads since September 11. The Awadallah court's citing
of the defendant's failure to come forward as the principal basis for his
detention is the most recent example.213 Another example is the failure of
the Third Circuit in Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft to hold the Justice Department
Similarly, in the law of remedies, "irreparable harm" that cannot be redressed by a
subsequent monetary award justifies the issuance of an injunction, a form of relief considered
extraordinary because of its assertion of control over the future conduct of an individual or entity.
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) ("[Ilt has long been held that an injunction is to be
used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case." (internal quotations omitted)); DAN D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1, at 27, § 2.5, at 57 (1973); cf DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 5-6 (1991) (arguing that irreparable harm is no
longer significant factor in awarding of equitable relief); Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the
Standard for Preliminary Relief 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197, 205-10 (2003) (arguing that standard
fails to address impact of uncertainty about the future on court's ability to assess irreparable
harm).
210. See Florida v.. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000) (suppressing a search based on an
anonymous informant's description of an individual's appearance in routine criminal case but
suggesting that information about bomb might present different set of considerations).
211. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-57 (1984).
212. See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 970-
71 (2003) (arguing that magnitude of possible harm in Moussaouiwould have permitted probable
cause finding, despite a lesser showing of probability). The nature of the threat posed by admitted
al Qaeda operatives such as Moussaoui might also justify detention, although not the virtually
unreviewable confinement favored by the Bush Administration. Cf Slobogin, supra note 150, at
46 (arguing that commitment of active members of al Qaeda to "ending innocent lives in disregard
of international legal principles and any threat to their own life distinguishes them from the
'deterrable' common criminal," and thereby justifies preventive detention cabined by appropriate
procedural safeguards); Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 15, at 417-25 (same).
213. Awadallah 11, 349 F.3d 42, 70 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861 (2005).
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accountable for its delay in providing an immigration detainee with specific
notice of the charges against him.
21 4
One way to cope with the erosion of particularity is to employ a more
robust interpretation of Franks v. Delaware to omissions from affidavits
supporting arrest warrants. 215  The premise of Franks is that officials
issuing warrants should act on the basis of materially accurate information.
Although courts cannot expect law enforcement personnel, particularly in
exigent circumstances, to catalog exhaustively all information known to
them, it is reasonable to expect that they will include material information,
even if it casts some doubt on probable cause.216 An omission can
otherwise prevent the officer determining the sufficiency of the affidavit
from doing her job, making law enforcement officials arbiters of probable
cause not subject to review. This potential for lack of effective review is a
core danger of informational overreaching.
As the district court noted in Awadallah, the affidavit supporting the
warrant for Awadallah's arrest as a material witness omitted several facts
relevant to the issue of both the materiality of his potential testimony and
214. 273 F.3d 542, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2001). In Kiareldeen, after the Justice Department
belatedly provided the detainee with specific notice of the charges against him, the detainee was
able to demonstrate that immigration authorities had relied on a witness-an unfriendly ex-
spouse-who had a demonstrable bias against the immigrant and a track record of unsupported
allegations. Furthermore, the latest allegations were also materially inaccurate. See Kiareldeen v.
Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416-17 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that the immigrant's ex-wife had made
repeated allegations of domestic violence against him, but had failed to substantiate any of these
accusations), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 557 (3d Cir.
2001) (denying immigrant's motion for attorney's fees and holding that the government's
provision of a specific public summary of the secret evidence to the immigrant, however belated,
rendered its position "substantially justified"); see also Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1358-
59 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (granting writ of habeas corpus because Immigration and Naturalization
Service summarized the secret evidence against the immigrant in general and conclusory fashion,
asserting without elaboration that the immigrant was involved with a terrorist organization),
vacated as moot sub nom. Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F. 3d 1330 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Najjar v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 1262, 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (declining to rule on secret evidence issue but affirming
denial of asylum to petitioner on other grounds); cf Haddam, 2000 WL 1901995 (Board of
Immigration Appeals Dec. 1, 2000) (unpublished decision) (considering secret evidence, but
granting claimant's request for asylum); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that secret evidence "is abhorrent to free men, because it
provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the
role of informer undetected and uncorrected"); Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two
Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 51 (1999); David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v.
Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 68-76 (arguing that due process bars use of secret information in
removal proceedings against lawful permanent residents); Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals, supra
note 29, at 503 n. 119 (discussing issues of secret evidence).
215. 438 U.S. 154, 164-72 (1978) (discussing requirements for affidavits setting out probable
cause for issuance of warrants).
216. See United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 1992).
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217the impracticability of securing it by less restrictive means. These facts,
viewed in their entirety, suggest Awadallah had no recent contact with the
hijackers, knew little about the hijackers' plans, had substantial incentives
to stay in the country, and had responded to questioning. Disclosure of this
information would have had a number of salutary consequences. It would
have given the judicial officer considering the issuance of the warrant
sufficient information to weigh all concerns appropriately. Additionally it
would have balanced out the stereotypes of immigrants the affidavit
exploited by merely noting that Awadallah had family in Jordan.
Disclosure of these facts would also have placed in context Awadallah's
failure to come forward after September 11, making clear that the evidence
suggested no operational connection between Awadallah and the attacks.
The Second Circuit should have held that such omissions rose to the level
of misrepresentation.
Holding that the law enforcement officials in Awadallah violated the
Franks standard would have affirmed the importance of particularity. Since
the trial court had found that the twenty days of Awadallah's confinement
created a sense of disorientation that caused his misstatements of fact to the
grand jury, the Franks analysis outlined above would also have required
excluding those statements and dismissing the underlying perjury charge. 2, 8
This result would have deprived the government of the incentive to detain
individuals such as Awadallah on amorphous grounds, such as the failure to
come forward, in the hope that aggressive interrogation will "press the
witness unduly, . . . browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, ... push him
217. See Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861 (2005). Less restrictive means would have included service of
a subpoena to appear before the grand jury voluntarily.
Current law also requires proof that the omissions of the official submitting the affidavit
were intentional or reckless. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 66-68 (citing United States v. Canfield,
212 F.3d 713, 717-18 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Second Circuit held that the defendant had failed to
meet this standard, observing, inter alia, that the presence in the affidavit of a form disclaimer
indicating that the affidavit did not include some facts known to law enforcement demonstrated
the absence of the requisite intent. Id. Relying on the presence of a form disclaimer to negate
intent exacerbates the problem of lack of sufficient information to review that plagues the Second
Circuit's narrow interpretation of Franks.
218. The district court reached this conclusion. Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 82. The
analysis of material omissions should incorporate consideration of the exigency of the situation.
Suppose, for example, that the defendant in Awadallah had engaged in conduct closer to the
conduct of Zacarias Moussaoui, whose enrollment in flight school suggested ongoing operational
ties to al Qaeda. If the government had included such facts in its affidavit supporting probable
cause, any omission in the affidavit would have been immaterial, unless the fact omitted clearly
and conclusively demonstrated the witness's lack of both knowledge and dangerousness (such as
the government's possession of a written confirmation from a reputable air carrier attesting to its
sponsorship of the witness's aviation training). Cf Lemer, supra note 212, at 970-71 (discussing
Moussaoui case).
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into a comer, and . . . entrap [the witness] into fatal contradictions. 21 9
Employing an institutional perspective would thus have arrayed the courts
firmly against the second coming of "the third degree' 220 signaled by
informational overreaching.
B. Re-framing Prejudice
As courts affirm the importance of particularity, they should also re-
frame their approach to prejudice. Prejudice has long been the touchstone
of inquiries about the scope of judicial power to dismiss charges or order a
new trial. 221 Focusing on prejudice seems to confer a sense of proportion on
such remedies, precluding the possibility that inadvertent or isolated acts of
misconduct by prosecutors will frustrate society's interest in holding
persons accused of crime accountable.222 However, the narrowness of the
courts' inquiry into prejudice fails to address unfairness suffered by
defendants or to deter prosecutorial misconduct. Responding to these
problems, courts should adopt a presumption of prejudice in cases reflecting
a pattern of prosecutors' noncompliance with established norms.
To consider the issue of unfairness to defendants the traditional test
fails to uncover, consider the example of pretrial publicity. Traditional
methods for discovering prejudice, such as questioning jurors, are not
219. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896)). The
concurring opinion in Awadallah II suggested an alternate basis for declining to dismiss the
perjury charge: holding that Awadallah's statements to the grand jury constituted a separate
offense unrelated to his detention. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 79-83 (Straub, J., concurring in the
judgment on separate grounds). The concurrence supported this argument by noting that
Awadallah had access to a lawyer on several occasions prior to his grand jury appearance. Id. at
82. It seems artificial, however, to find that access to a lawyer neutralized the impact of
Awadallah's concededly illegal initial seizure and interview, as well as his subsequent detention
as a material witness. The Second Circuit did not question this, leaving undisturbed the district
court's finding that Awadallah's twenty-day detention materially caused his inaccurate statements
before the grand jury. Id. at 70-71 n.24.
220. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-43 (citing Brown, 161 U.S. at 596-97) (discussing abuses in
custodial interrogation).
221. The harmless error rule, codified at Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a), which requires that an error
materially affect the defendant's prospects at trial, applies to most errors considered on appeal.
See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988) (discussing harmless error
rule); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-312 (1991) (applying harmless error rule to
admission of coerced confessions). But see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986)
(holding that racial discrimination in grand jury selection is fundamental error that gives rise to
presumption of prejudice); but ef Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88
VA. L. REv. 1 (2002) (arguing that harmless error doctrine discourages innovation in the law).
222. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946) (justifying harmless error
rule by noting concern with granting "fairly convicted" defendants "the multiplicity of loopholes
which any highly rigid and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially in relation to procedure,
will engender and reflect in a printed record").
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necessarily reliable. Jurors may well be reluctant to acknowledge that they
have read newspapers or encountered media reports. The nature of the
questioning, which will tend to be leading (e.g., "Did you see news reports
yesterday about... ?"), suggests a negative answer. This signaling by the
questioner, however subtle and unintentional, creates a significant risk of
"false negatives"-persons who respond, "No," to the question, as the
questioner seems to desire, but who have in fact seen the problematic media
accounts. While judges may seek to refine the sophistication of their
inquiries, the problem remains. Similarly, defense counsel may have a real
incentive to ferret out prejudice among jurors, but face a troublesome
dilemma in deciding how vigorously to pursue this information. If defense
lawyers are too probing, they end up promoting the result they fear:
enhanced juror knowledge about the problematic disclosures, and enhanced
prejudice.223
A further asymmetry is that publicity in a given case creates what
economists call "negative externalities," i.e., adverse consequences
experienced by third parties, often based on invidious grounds.224 In
terrorism cases, for example, extrajudicial remarks have an adverse impact
not merely on the defendant, but on other terrorism defendants who share
particular attributes, such as ethnicity or religion. Traditional mechanisms
such as voir dire, which rely on both the candor and self-awareness of
prospective jurors,225 cannot erase these negative externalities. As a result,
226comments by prosecutors create a cascade of condemnation, as in the
World War I or McCarthy Era situations, that prejudices defendants as a
group.
22 7
The minimal impact of the narrow inquiry into prejudice also creates a
dangerous asymmetry in prosecutors' institutional incentives. In times of
crisis, institutional pressures gravitate even more strongly than usual toward
prosecutors "pushing the envelope" to gain a litigation advantage.
Prosecutors, who are satisfying bureaucratic players seeking to avoid the
223. Cf Alschuler, supra note 29, at 656-58.
224. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 337 (1987).
225. Cf id. at 321-23 (discussing racial prejudice as uncolscious, rather than intentional,
phenomenon); Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII,
34 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 529, 535-45 (2003) (discussing manifestations of unconscious
racism in the workplace).
226. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 80 (discussing dynamics of cascades that drive public
policy toward extremes).
227. See generally MURPHY, supra note 25 (discussing persecution of dissidents during World
War I); Stone, supra note 98 (same); Wiecek, supra note 99 (discussing climate of condemnation
affecting persons identified as Communists through the 1960s).
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greatest embarrassment, will often find themselves pulled away from the
requirement to do justice in high-profile cases, where promoting justice will
yield little institutional benefit for them, and cutting comers creates only a
small risk of some amorphous sanction such as professional discipline in
the dim future.228 In contrast, where the institutional signaling from
superiors condones or encourages cutting comers, prosecutors will heavily
discount future problems and focus on present rewards.2 29 Success at a trial
is a present goal, with immediate ramifications in terms of the prosecutor's
standing with her superiors and peers, and her level of approval from the
public.23°  Informational overreaching that serves this goal, such as
extrajudicial statements praising the government's case or failure to
disclose possibly exculpatory evidence, may seem imperative.
Furthermore, the narrowness of the present inquiry into prejudice
encourages prosecutors to "game the system," by signaling that courts will
not view most transgressions as serious.
Given this combination of a heightened risk of false negatives and
asymmetrical incentives for prosecutors, courts should adopt a conclusive
presumption of prejudice regarding a pattern of informational overreaching.
The concerns animating this change dove-tail with the concerns that drive
cases, such as the discriminatory selection of grand jurors, where such a
presumption currently applies.231 In the current cases where a presumption
holds, the Court has found a serious risk that the practice in question will
compromise the integrity of the justice system or permit the exclusion of a
particular group.232 Taken together, the practices comprising informational
228. Cf Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2209, 2236-60 (2003) (discussing political and institutional factors that tend to broaden the
scope of criminal liability under federal statutes); Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra
note 18 (discussing institutional incentives of prosecutors and other law enforcement officials);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001)
(discussing convergence of interests between legislators and prosecutors that broadens scope of
criminal law).
229. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIOR
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45-46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing individuals' tendency to
heavily discount future costs); cf David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112
Q. J. EcON. 443 (1997) (analyzing how individuals use "commitment mechanisms" such as
insurance policies or savings plans to remedy tendency to unduly discount the future); Ted
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999)
(analyzing "present-biased preferences").
230. See Alschuler, supra note 29, at 668 ("If the courts would begin to exhibit a working
commitment to the ideals of prosecutorial dignity and impartiality, the present volumeof
misconduct . . . could be reduced-simply because prosecutors do care about retrials and lost
convictions.").
231. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986).
232. Id.
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overreaching raise similar risks, permitting the government to skew the
outcome of adjudication and "poison the well" of public opinion against
groups the government deems to be unsafe.233 A presumption of prejudice
would address the heightened risk of false negatives and asymmetry in
prosecutors' incentives, encouraging prosecutors to disclose more to the
defense and the court and say less to the press.
A presumption of prejudice would dictate that when a pattern of
informational overreaching by the prosecution has arisen, courts would
dismiss charges precipitated by the pattern, or order a new trial in response
to abuses that occurred in the initial trial. Court would view examples of
informational overreaching in combination. For example, instead of
undertaking a compartmentalized analysis of the prejudice caused by
failures to disclose and excessive extrajudicial comments, the court would
view such incidents in combination as reflecting an institutional trend
toward overreaching. Such an institutional perspective would place a
priority on shaping the ex ante incentives of prosecutors to deter future
transgressions.234 Based on such an institutional analysis, a court would
view the informational overreaching in United States v. Koubriti,235
including the multiple incidents of inappropriate pretrial publicity on the
part of Ashcroft and the withholding of the letter calling into question the
veracity of the government's chief witness, as warranting a new trial.236
233. On the costs of such targeting in law enforcement investigations, see Samuel R. Gross &
Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1423-30 (2002)
(discussing dignitary harm caused by racial profiling); Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and
Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675, 724-26 (2002-2003) (same); see also Leonard M.
Baynes, Racial Profiling, September 11th, and the Media: A Critical Race Theory Analysis, 2 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing racially oriented images in media portrayals of post-
September 11 figures).
234. Such a presumption would also entail modifying or overruling a series of precedents.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52-55 (1992) (judicial supervisory power does
not extend to dismissing case because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury when
alleged misconduct does not constitute violation of constitutional guarantees); Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (harmless error rules applies to grand jury
proceedings); cf Kamin, supra note 221 (arguing against utility of harmless error rule); Nicki
Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
45-50 (2004).
235. 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 742-757 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (determining that Ashcroft violated
court's order, but declining to initiate further proceedings to determine whether he was guilty of
contempt).
236. The Koubriti defendants' filed a motion for new trial and acquittal after the jury
convicted them. See Serrano, supra note 8. Following the motion, a series of events led to a great
deal of publicity:
rTlhe Justice Det)artment's decision to reolace the Assistant United States Attorneys
who prosecuted this case with new counsel; the institution of a civil lawsuit against the
Attorney General and other Justice Department officials bv one of the former AUSAs.
Richard Convertino, challenging his removal from the case; the new prosecutor's
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A presumption of prejudice in cases involving a pattern of
informational overreaching would have a useful ex ante effect, encouraging
the prosecutor to deliberate more extensively. Such a shift to an ex ante
institutional perspective would entail costs. If prosecutors failed to
internalize the ex ante guidance they received, defendants whose factual
guilt was not open to question might go free. The benefit of such an
institutional approach, however, is that sending a clear message minimizes
the chances that society will incur those costs.
The Supreme Court invoked this calculus in Miranda when it
abandoned the atomistic inquiry about the voluntariness of confession in
favor of a clear prophylactic standard.237 The Court acknowledged that
there might be cases where a confession obtained in violation of Miranda
was voluntary, given the totality of the circumstances.238 However, the
Court viewed excluding a confession in such a case as salutary, in light of
the Court's overriding objective of outlawing use of the "third degree" in
custodial interrogations.239  The Court recognized that an ex ante
institutional remedy would offer much-needed clarity to both defendants
and law enforcement. Indeed, as the Court recognized in re-affirming
Miranda recently, the clarity of an ex ante perspective aids law enforcement
in the discharge of its obligations by promoting certainty and
predictability. 240 A presumption of prejudice in cases involving a pattern of
informational overreaching would accomplish the same goal.
Courts responding to governmental excesses must also decline the
discovery of potential Bradv/Gizlio materials in the case file that had not been turned
over to Defendants or the Court either prior to or during the course of trial- the Court's
conducting of an evidentiarv hearing regarding the failure of the Government to
disclose this Bradv/Gizlio material during pretrial discovery or during the course of the
seven-week trial; the Court's consequent order directing the Government to conduct a
full-scale review of the entire case in order to discern whether any other potential
Bradv/Gizlio materials were not turned over to the defense or the Court; and the
Attorney General's appointment of a Special Attorney to lead this review.
United States v. Koubriti, 307 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2004) ("Koubriti II1"). In
response, the court ordered that while the motion for new trial and acquittal were pending, no
person with knowledge of the case could disclose confidential information not in the public
record. Id. at 902.
Eventually, the government "confess[ed] error" and filed a separate motion to dismiss
because of its Brady/Gigio violations. Koubriti IV, 336 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
The district court granted the motion to dismiss the terrorism related charges in Count I. It also
granted the defendants' motion for a new trial, which the government acquiesced to, as to the
document fraud charges in Count II. Id. at 678, 682; see also id. at 679 (describing government's
actions in seeking to dismiss one count and acquiescing in a new trial for another as "legally and
ethically correct" and "in the highest and best tradition of Department of Justice attorneys").
237. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1966).
238. Id. at 457.
239. Id. at 447.
240. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
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temptation to discount prejudice where it is clearly present. Critics have
persistently charged that the harmless error rule encourages such
discounting.241 Law and terrorism cases compound the problem.
The judicial discounting of manifest prejudice is clearly on view in
United States v. Moussaoui. The Fourth Circuit overruled the considered
judgment of the district court that the government's failure to produce a
detainee with exculpatory information for a video deposition would
prejudice the defendant.242 Purporting to apply by analogy the balancing
test required by CIPA, the appellate court's decision trivializes the
importance to the defendant of using the deposition to develop other
exculpatory evidence. Harm is caused by forcing the defendant at trial to
use summaries prepared, by the government, instead of more dramatic
deposition testimony. While minimizing the defendant's concerns, the
Fourth Circuit inflates the government's interest in barring pre-trial, non-
public access to the detainee-an interest outside CIPA's scope. A legal
standard permitting the dismissal of charges even without a demonstration
of prejudice to the defendant could encourage courts to act more strongly
when government obstruction threatened to compromise fairness at trial.
In sum, reframing prejudice would offer a welcome antidote to
government overreaching. It would enhance ex ante incentives for
prosecutors to comply with legal standards. It would also act as a welcome
corrective to the judicial tendency to discount prejudice through application
of the harmless error rule. Finally, focusing judicial scrutiny on the subtler
forms of disadvantage suffered by terrorism defendants would heighten
sensitivity to the cases such as Moussaoui in which palpable prejudice goes
unremedied.
C. Requiring Organizational Integrity Instead of Subjective Good Faith
As a third and final step, an institutional approach would replace the
bad faith standard for violations of court orders by prosecutors with a
standard that focuses on structural safeguards. Courts considering sanctions
for violations of court orders have often insisted on a "smoking gun" that
demonstrates malicious intent.243 However, this subjective test asks the
241. See Alschuler, supra note 29; Kamin, supra note 221.
242. 365 F.3d 292, 314, amended on reh'g by 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385).
243. See In re Smothers, 322 F.3d 438, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2003) (vacating finding of contempt
after noting that basis for finding-legal aid attorney's lateness for hearing---could have been
accidental, inadvertent, or negligent); United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 828 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citing defense attorney for contempt after repeated violations of court order limiting extrajudicial
comments).
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wrong questions of large institutions such as- the Justice Department, where
officials can invoke the scale of the organization to minimize their own
role.244  Focusing on the adequacy of structural controls against
informational overreaching would re-frame the analysis to promote greater
accountability.
In other settings where organizations dominate, courts have promoted
accountability through institutional measures. For example, the Supreme
Court has indicated that corporations can defend themselves against claims
that they knowingly tolerated sexual harassment of their employees by
establishing procedures for dealing with sexual harassment complaints.
245
In the class action context, where plaintiffs' attorneys may have conflicts of
interests because of the divergent situations of class members, courts have
required the establishment of sub-classes to more effectively represent those
disparate interests.246 In the area of funding of terrorist groups, federal
statutes, regulations, and guidelines encourage charities to perform due
diligence inquiries before contributing.247 Each of these structural measures
244. Cf Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1991) (advocating entity-based approach to disciplinary issues involving participants in law
firms); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 775
(2001) (suggesting appropriateness of Schneyer's approach for addressing patterns of misconduct
within prosecutor's offices); see also Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics,
supra note 18 (discussing federal courts as sources of professional discipline for prosecutors). But
see Alschuler, supra note 29, at 670-73 (viewing professional discipline imposed by traditional
authorities, such as state bar association grievance committees, as ineffective tool for regulation of
prosecutors); Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to
Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 14 (2002) (expressing doubts about
fairness and efficacy of Schneyer's model). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Collective
Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003) (discussing history, utility, and fairness of collective
sanctions in legal culture).
245. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-08 (1998) (discussing
importance of a corporate sexual harassment policy as a defense to sexual harassment claims).
246. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 521 U.S. 591, 625-28 (1997); cf Margulies, Public
Interest Law, supra note 53, at 526-30.
247. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES:
VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES 6-7, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/docs/tocc.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2005) (created for
purpose of promoting compliance with Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b) (2000), describing prophylactic steps recommended for
domestic charities regarding foreign recipients of aid, including searching the internet and other
public sources of information, requiring detailed reports from recipients, requiring list of
organizations which recipient assists or with which recipient does business, and when possible
conducting audits of major recipients); cf Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals, supra note 29 (arguing
that careful regulation of terrorist financing can promote organizational accountability, while
cautioning against potential for government overreaching); Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of
Solidarity, supra note 17 (same); Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 35, at 1000-1001 (expressing
doubt about constitutionality of statute barring "material support" of terrorist organizations); see
also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding
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creates incentives for greater organizational vigilance and penalties for
abdication of responsibility.
In addressing issues of prosecutorial misconduct, federal courts already
have inherent and supervisory power to deter informational overreaching,
even in the absence of willfulness or bad faith. 48 The touchstone for
exercise of the court's inherent power is necessity.249  On the occasions
when a lack of adequate alternative remedies make the exercise of inherent
authority similar to the enforcement of the court's orders and to the
maintenance of the integrity of judicial proceedings, necessity can authorize
exercise of this authority without a "smoking gun" that indicates the
presence of bad faith. °
In the Koubriti case, the court could have found that Ashcroft's failure
to implement workable procedures for preventing unwarranted public
constitutionality of prohibition on material support); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d
1130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding statute, while holding that certain terms were vague as
applied), cert. denied sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001);
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200-1201 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(holding vague as applied bar on "expert advice or assistance" to designated terrorist organizations
in USA PATRIOT Act); Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention
Paradigm: The Guilty By Association Critique 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1433-51 (2003)
(reviewing DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2002)
and DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) [hereinafter COLE, DOUBLE STANDARDS]) (arguing that certain
statutory terms, such as "personnel," cut too close to criminalizing mere membership in
organization and are therefore void for vagueness). Scholars have made similar arguments about
the effect of liability rules on corporate responsibility. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001) (arguing that
multinational corporations should be held accountable for human rights violations resulting from
enterprises over which they have control).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839-840 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
prospectively that court could exercise supervisory power to suppress evidence yielded by sham
grand jury subpoena to represented target of investigation); United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d
782, 789-90 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding based on court's supervisory authority that absent express
waiver, prosecutor could not "debrief' cooperating witness without counsel being present); cf
Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984) (arguing
for clarification of judicial authority and linkage of supervisory power to violation of specific
constitutional and statutory provisions); Etienne, supra note 23, at 2147-51 (discussing contours
of supervisory and inherent power of courts); Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal
Prosecutors' Ethics, supra note 18, at 407-08. (same). But see Gleeson, supra note 34 (criticizing
Hammad and Ming He as excessive and largely ineffective exercises ofjudicial power).
249. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking, 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that courts can
interpret "necessity" broadly to include power that is "highly useful in the pursuit of a just
result"); cf Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, supra note 18, at 403-05
(discussing judicial remedies for prosecutorial misconduct under court's inherent authority).
250. See Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74 n. 11 (3d Cir.
1995) (asserting that express finding of bad faith was not a prerequisite for imposition of sanctions
under court's inherent power).
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remarks required some form of structural relief. At the very least, Ashcroft
failed to exercise appropriate supervisory responsibility over Justice
Department personnel, even after committing himself through his delegates,
to exercise such supervision. 25 1 Even without a finding of bad faith, the
court could have held that the failure to implement sound procedures
constituted sufficient evidence that Ashcroft did not view the court's order
with sufficient seriousness,252 and did not place a high priority on
compliance.253
Potential structural safeguards for the Justice Department could include
measures that would deter future informational overreaching. 254 The court
could invoke its supervisory and inherent power to require the Attorney
General to produce a report detailing the procedural history of the apparent
violations, and suggesting methods in which officials could better
implement Justice Department guidelines and ethical mandates in the
future.2 55 Alternatively, the court could appoint a Special Master to make
recommendations to the court on this score.256 Prophylactic procedures
could include a requirement that the line prosecutor in a terrorism matter
consult in writing with a supervisor and with a representative of the
Attorney General regarding disclosure of any material that could affect the
credibility of a government witness. Regarding gratuitous pretrial publicity,
the court could order that the Attorney General and subordinate Justice
251. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 733-40 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
252. This finding would have effectively distinguished Koubriti II from an earlier case where
a federal appeals court had vacated a contempt finding against the then Attorney General. See In
re Attorney General, 596 F.2d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1979) (vacating district court's contempt finding on
grounds that Attorney General had asserted colorable legal claim of privilege regarding court's
earlier order, and that court had failed to consider less intrusive means of ensuring adequate
discovery for plaintiffs).
253. This inference is even more compelling based on Ashcroft's very prominent efforts in
other contexts to exert heightened control over decision-making within federal prosecutors'
offices. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing Ashcroft's efforts to
discourage plea bargaining, increase requests for the death penalty, and report judges who had
made downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines).
254. For other proposals with a structural slant on prosecutorial conduct and discretion, see
John Q. Barrett, The Leak and the Craft: A Hard Line Proposal to Stop Unaccountable
Disclosures of Law Enforcement Information, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 613, 633-36 (1999); cf
Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in
-Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893 (2000) (suggesting guidelines to inform
exercise of discretion in cases involving federal prosecution of parents using interstate travel to
evade child support obligations).
255. See In re Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
256. See Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920), cited in Eash v. Riggins Trucking, 757
F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the court has inherent power to appoint an individual
who can assist the court "in the performance of specific judicial duties").
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Department personnel pre-clear or filepublic, statements with the court,257
or with relevant departmental offices, such as the Professional
Responsibility Advisory Office, or the Office of the Inspector General.258
The court could also take a less deferential stance toward the executive
branch when construing willfulness and bad faith. When a senior official
with tremendous resources at his disposal, such as the Attorney General,
has clear notice of a court order and nonetheless violates that order on two
occasions, a finding of willfulness seems appropriate. Ashcroft's mere
avowals in Koubriti that his remarks were "inadvertent" should not be
sufficient to defeat this inference. 259 Nor did Ashcroft demonstrate the kind
of clear insight into the problems of prosecutorial publicity that the court
had a right to expect when he phrased his discussion of his remarks in
conditional terms, describing how his "statements, however brief and
passing, . . .could have been considered. . . to be a breach . . .of the
Court's Order., 260 A court's refusal even to engage in further fact-finding
in this situation seems to place the Attorney General above the reach of the
contempt power, able to compromise the integrity of the judicial process
with impunity. Courts owe it to constitutional values to dismantle such a
would-be monolith.261
257. See Brown, supra note 48.
258. Some structural remedies for informational overreaching might require a modification of
the temporal and spatial limitations on judicial supervision of law enforcement. Usually, for
example, a court's authority to order ongoing affirmative relief on the part of the prosecution
terminates at the conclusion of the trial. In addition, in criminal cases a judge is usually limited to
ordering relief in proceedings before him or her. In extraordinary cases, however, judges
imposing affirmative relief on the prosecution have ordered that relief after trial, in order to
prevent future misconduct. See In re Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (in order
to "make known the truth and deter future misconduct," court, after government moved to dismiss
charges against terrorism suspect, ordered federal prosecutor to submit report on improper
questioning of defendant); cf Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1992) (subsequent
finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not deprive court of power to impose sanctions
under rule 11 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 409-09 (1990) (court can impose rule 11 sanctions even after a party's voluntary dismissal of
an action); see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 69 (1986) (noting that the district
court, in a case in which government had violated rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure by presenting the simultaneous testimony of two government agents, "undertook to
ensure future compliance with the one-witness rule by directing the Government to keep the court
advised concerning compliance with Rule 6(d) in future criminal cases"). In addition, the special
risk of a generalized climate of condemnation in terrorism cases, spurred by nationwide publicity,
the common religious or ethnic background of the defendants, and the public's perception of an
overarching national security threat may justify relief with a broader geographic scope.
259. Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. An institutional approach by courts would complement in-house sources of accountability
already in place within the Justice Department that have addressed law enforcement excesses after
September 11. For example, the Office of the Inspector General filed a report that severely
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For this reason, the court in Koubriti should have considered at least
requiring Ashcroft to personally appear in federal district court in Detroit to
show cause why the court should not hold him in contempt. The judge
could have engaged in further fact-finding on such an occasion, asking
Ashcroft if he was familiar with the Rules of Professional Conduct, federal
regulations, and Department of Justice guidelines. Such questioning would
have provided a better opportunity for the court, to gauge the level of
willfulness exhibited by Ashcroft. Instead, the judge was restricted to an
optimistic reading of the lawyerly phrases in Ashcroft's guarded letter of
apology. Indeed, to the extent that a lawyer or lawyers on Ashcroft's staff
drafted the letter, the court's acceptance of the apology made in the letter
exacerbated the troubling tendency of Ashcroft to assert virtually plenary
control over the Justice Department when that served his agenda, but to
shift responsibility to subordinates when confronted.262 An institutional
approach by courts would stop this bureaucratic two-step, sending a clear
message that responsibility starts at the top.
A similar approach to institutional integrity might have more
criticized the government's detention of over a thousand aliens in the months after the attacks.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A
REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (April 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf. This report received extensive coverage in the
press and helped spur congressional hearings into the detentions. Lessons Learned-The
Inspector General's Report on the 9/11 Detainees: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004); cf William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police
Misconduct, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 665, 677-78 (2002) (discussing role of media coverage
in promoting government accountability). Part of the problem with the detentions was the
slowness of the Justice Department, particularly the INS, which insisted on receiving clearances
from the FBI indicating that a given detainee had no links with terrorism. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra, at 37. The Justice Department has undertaken reform of its procedures to clear immigrant
detainees in a more timely fashion and release them when appropriate. See Eric Lichtblau, US
Will Tighten Rules on Holding Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2003, at Al.
Another source of accountability has been the efforts of civil liberties and human rights
lawyers who have pressured the Justice Department and other government agencies to reform their
practices in the war on terror. See COLE, DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 247, at 159-79
(discussing author's efforts to litigate against government overreaching, inter alia, in the use of
"secret evidence" against immigration detainees); Podgor & Hall, supra note 17, 154-60 (noting
efforts of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to ease restrictions on defense
lawyers in terrorism cases); Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in
the U.S. "War on Terrorism, " 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 47 (2004) (discussing role of international
human rights organizations), at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol5/issl/art 2 /.
262. Ashcroft has even sought to deflect blame to lower-ranking officials from previous
Administrations. See Eric Lichtblau, White House Criticizes Justice Dept. Over Papers, N.Y.
TIMES, April 30, 2004, at A24 (reporting on reaction to Ashcroft's release, in testimony before
September 11 Commission, of classified memos by Jamie Gorelick, Commission member and
Deputy Attorney General in Clinton Administration).
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effectively dealt with the government's blanket justification in Moussaoui
that any access to a detainee would disrupt interrogation. A court could
view a party's assumption of an inflexible legal position as reflecting a
failure to accept the accountability at the heart of the separation of powers.
The fact that the government openly asserts its position does nothing to
reduce its intransigency. Indeed, the government's blanket refusal to share
information in terrorism prosecutions reveals the accelerating influence of
habits of highhandedness and secrecy that threaten constitutional values.
The same analysis should prevail regarding the Moussaoui prosecutors'
effort to assert that they have no control over the actions of the
government.263 The party listed for that case, in addition to the defendant,
is the "United States of America." If prosecutors wish to represent that
party, with all the credibility and legitimacy that such representation
yields,26 they should also accept responsibility for decisions made
elsewhere in the executive branch that affect their case. A defendant cannot
escape the impact of the government's decisions regarding access to
exculpatory information. Prosecutors should, similarly, be held to account.
V. RESPONDING TO CRITIQUES
A. Separation of Powers
Critics of the institutional approach may argue that increased judicial
activism with respect to prosecutorial and other governmental practices will
violate the separation of powers. The government needs flexibility to
respond to transnational terrorist networks, which have demonstrated a
capacity to inflict catastrophic losses on U.S. civilians. Additional scrutiny
or the possibility of contempt citations may chill government efforts in an
area where the most risky course can be doing nothing.265 In addition,
undue judicial intrusion into the functioning of the executive branch will
involve the courts in matters in which they have little expertise and distort
the mechanisms for accountability to the electorate and oversight by the
legislature.
Courts must display a prudent appreciation of the limits of their
expertise and authority when taking actions that affect other branches. The
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Williams stands for the
263. See supra note 7.
264. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d Cir. 1981).
265. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV.
605 (2003).
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'proposition that courts cannot micro-manage processes like grand jury
investigations that should have a substantial degree of independence in a
constitutional system.266 On the other hand, courts have always behaved as
though they had authority to maintain the integrity of the legal system,
particularly when the conduct of lawyers before a tribunal threatened to
undermine that crucial value.267
Informational overreaching by the executive branch threatens the
integrity of the legal process. The threat is most apparent in the "enemy
combatant" cases such as Padilla v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which
the executive has endeavored to set up an entire regime of confimement
without either legislative authorization or judicial review.268 The danger
posed by informational overreaching is more subtle, but no less real: the
prospect of terrorism prosecutions becoming a kind of independent fiefdom
within the criminal justice system, in which the executive largely makes its
own rules. The most pressing separation of powers concern should be the
fear that the executive branch's overreaching will render the courts
irrelevant.
Admittedly, the most controversial aspect of the recommendations
contained here-the ability to dismiss charges based on a pattern of
misconduct even absent proof of prejudice to the defendant-challenges the
cautionary note on excessive judicial authority struck in Williams.
269
However, under the institutional approach, courts would only impose this
kind of extreme sanction on a graduated basis and only once the
government had shown by its repeated misconduct that other methods were
ineffective. Ultimately, the justification for the institutional approach to
remedies is the importance of sending a clear message to the government
that overreaching threatens the integrity of the entire system. A
commitment by the government to meet this challenge need not conflict
266. 504 U.S. 36, 48-50 (1992); cf Beale, supra note 248 (urging limits on federal courts'
supervisory authority); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1314-36 (2003) [hereinafter
Zacharias & Green, Federal Court Authority] (discussing possible readings of Williams). But see
Kuckes, supra note 236 (arguing that the notion of grand jury independence is a fiction masking
prosecutorial authority).
267. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (relying on inherent authority
to sanction an attorney who had engaged in litigation misconduct such as the filing of frivolous
pleadings and delay); cf Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980) (discussing
inherent authority to sanction lawyers); Zacharias & Green, Federal Court Authority, supra note
266, at 1337-51 (discussing case law on federal courts' inherent authority).
268. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d. 564, 588-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124
S. Ct. 2633, 2626 (2004).
269. 504 U.S. at 49-50 (discussing the limitations on a court's supervisory power of grand
juries).
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with vigilance regarding the dangers presented by terrorist networks.
To demonstrate that there is not necessarily a conflict between an
enhanced judicial role and legitimate prerogatives of the executive, consider
the argument made by the district court in Koubriti that further contempt
proceedings might chill an Attorney General's performance of his
constitutionally mandated duty to inform the public.270 This argument fails
to acknowledge that the Attorney General has ample alternatives to making
specific public comments on cases pending or in trial. The Attorney
General can offer a more general description, explaining his circumspection
with reference to the court's order. He can also refer interested members of
271the public to other available sources of information.  While the Attorney
General may wish to impart his own "spin" on the proceedings, the best
prosecutors know that the most appropriate place to present both evidence
and argument is the courtroom. 272  This allocation of roles leaves the
Attorney General free to address overarching policy issues. Courts can play
an appropriate role in encouraging such productive delegation.
B. Unintended Consequences of the Institutional Approach
A second objection to an enhanced judicial role is that such activism
will prompt unintended consequences.273 These consequences could be
harmful to future defendants. Unintended consequences could also injure
efficiency or accuracy in the legal system as a whole. While this critique
270. See Koubriti II, 305 F. Supp. 2d 723, 748-50 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
271. The Justice Department can refer publicly to documents already filed in the case. See
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1052-53 (1991) (plurality opinion). Such
documents and other material are available on websites such as www.fmdlaw.com, subscription
databases such as Lexis, and a range of newspapers, magazines, and cable and broadcast outlets.
In law and terrorism cases, the public record may contain gaps caused by redactions made
for national security purposes. See United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 297, amended on
reh 'g by 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No.
04-8385). Since the government typically has requested such redactions, it cannot argue that these
gaps necessitate further public explanatory comments by senior government officials. Indeed,
arguing for untrammeled public expression by government officials seems like an odd posture for
an Administration whose signature is secrecy. See COLE, DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 247,
at 26-30 (discussing government's post-September 11 closure of immigration hearings for "special
interest" detainees, most of whom turned out to have no relationship to terrorism); Margulies,
Uncertain Arrivals, supra note 29 (same).
272. See Brown, supra note 48, at 112-17; cf United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184
(2d Cir. 1981) (discussing training of federal prosecutors).
273. Professor Stuntz has offered the most cogent analysis of the unintended consequences of
innovation in the law of criminal procedure. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship]; cf William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J.
2137 (2002) (discussing possible effect of September 11 attacks on criminal procedure generally).
[Vol. 34
ABOVE CONTEMPT?
suggests that courts should tailor the contours of the institutional approach
to minimize unintended consequences, it does not invalidate the case for
such an approach in the appropriate context.
Consider, for example, the argument that the institutional approach will
lengthen trials, as defense counsel make seriatim motions for dismissal
based on perceived patterns of-prosecutorial misconduct. 274 While this is a
legitimate concern, it is also possible that the setting of a prophylactic rule
will encourage the cultivation of the best practices by prosecutors to head
off such dilatory tactics. In the best prosecutors' offices, the default rules
already discourage public comments on pending cases and encourage
disclosure.275 Under an institutional approach, judges who observe these
best practices in action will see little need to intervene.276
An institutional approach might also spur congressional changes in
substantive criminal law, which will operate to the net disadvantage of
defendants. In other areas of the criminal law, skeptical analysis of the
"criminal procedure revolution" embodied by Miranda suggests that
legislatures have broadened the substantive definitions of crimes to make
charges easier to prove.277  These substantive changes do an "end-run"
around the criminal procedure doctrines that limit law enforcement's
evidence-gathering practices.
This argument has limited application to the overreaching at issue here.
The argument is most compelling in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
contexts, in which criminal procedure constrains methods of
investigation.278 However, only the first kind of informational overreaching
studied in this Article-insufficiency in applications for warrants-deals
with investigative techniques.279 Moreover, many terrorism prosecutions
are already brought under broad provisions, such as provisions barring
274. Professor Stuntz makes this argument in the context of non-terrorism prosecutions. See
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship, supra note 273, at 13-16.
275. Cf Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 18, at 816-18.
276. One could also argue that if in a case such as Moussaoui the courts force more access
than the executive desires, in the next case the government will have an incentive not to disclose
any exculpatory information. Courts can reduce the risks of such a response by carefully tailoring
access, as the trial court did in Moussaoui, to address legitimate security concerns. See Moussaoui
111, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482-87 (E.D. Va. 2003) (allowing video deposition, while denying
defendant's motion to require live testimony at trial of alleged al Qaeda higher-ups detained by the
government), affd in part, vacated in part, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-8385). Beyond this, courts should not make law
based on the fear that rejecting the government's legal arguments will cause the government to
violate clear constitutional obligations.
277. See Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship, supra note 273, at 56-59.
278. See id. at 17, 56-59.
279. See infra Part IV.A.
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"material support" of designated terrorist organizations or conspiracy to
commit terrorism or sedition.28 ° Congress would encounter substantial
constitutional barriers to further broadening of these statutes. 21  When
courts act to counter manifest prejudice, as the more robust approach of this
Article recommends in the Moussaoui case, any reaction by Congress that
limited defendants' access to exculpatory evidence beyond the limits
currently imposed by CIPA would also confront significant Sixth
Amendment obstacles.28 2 These barriers may encourage both Congress and
the executive to respond in a constructive way to an institutional approach
by enhancing effective internal organizational controls that reduce
informational overreaching.283
VI. CONCLUSION
Even in ordinary times, prosecutors and law enforcement personnel
benefit from the opportunity to manage the disclosure, distribution, and
interpretation of information. At the very beginning of an investigation,
prosecutors can select the facts that support issuance of an arrest or search
280. See AEDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2000) (defining material support), as amended by
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638,
3762.
281. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
certain terms of statute were vague as applied), cert. denied sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v.
Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185,
1200-1201 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding vague as applied bar on "expert advice or assistance" to
designated terrorist organizations in the USA PATRIOT Act).
282. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1957) (requiring government to
disclose identity of informant). Congress can exert control over the content of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, ensuring the survival of the harmless error rule. Congress could also limit,
but most likely not eliminate, the courts' contempt power. See Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) ("The ability to punish disobedience to judicial
orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own
authority without complete dependence on other Branches."); cf Zacharias & Green, supra note
266, at 1311-13 (discussing non-delegated sources ofjudicial authority). Avoiding these counter-
moves from Congress hinges on the courts' ability to use equitable authority wisely, focusing on
egregious cases of overreaching.
283. Probing the assumptions of a legal regime, and suggesting alternatives, can be useful
even when alternatives will not be immediately adopted. Professor Stuntz built on his analysis of
unintended consequences of the criminal procedure revolution by urging substantially more
funding for defense counsel and a greater willingness by courts to review the proportionality of
sentences mandated by legislatures for particular crimes. See Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship,
supra note 273, at 65-68. There are compelling arguments for both of these reforms, even if their
prospects for immediate adoption are uncertain. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-77
(2003) (rejecting proportionality challenge to California "three strikes" law). Over time,
questioning assumptions and providing alternatives can provoke change at the margins, or even
change paradigms.
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warrant. Later, when prosecutors draft an .indictment, they can fashion a
narrative that moves their agenda, and casts the defendant in a narrative of
their choosing. Faced with the obligation to disclose to the defense
information that may contradict or undermine that chosen narrative,
prosecutors know what evidence they have, while the defense and the court
are to a large extent dependent on the prosecutor's good will,
professionalism, and commitment to doing justice.
In ordinary times, courts rely on a relational paradigm to reduce the
likelihood that prosecutors will abuse their power over information. Courts
invoke a shared stake with prosecutors in the integrity of judicial
proceedings. Prosecutors who flout this mutual dependence, for example
through inappropriate and excessive extrajudicial comments about a
pending case, receive informal sanctions such as mention in published
opinions, signaling the prosecutors' imperiled status in the relationship. For
prosecutors, who are often young lawyers building reputations, such
informal sanctions act as a valuable source of discipline and accountability.
In this sense, the relational paradigm supplements the relatively mild case
law on excesses relating to information, which often hinges on a finding of
actual prejudice to the defendant or bad faith on the part of the prosecutor.
In high profile and national security cases, prosecutors face
extraordinary pressures to control the flow of information to courts,
defendants, and the public. Senior officials embrace a political agenda that
has little room for the nuances implicit in the prosecutor's duty to do
justice. The response of the prosecutors to this new set of institutional
imperatives results is the erosion of: 1) the requirement that the government
show a particularized need for coercion or restraint; 2) the obligation to
share exculpatory evidence with the defense, including access to witnesses
as in Moussaoui; and 3) the obligation to refrain from gratuitous public
comments about defendants pending or during trial. This Article refers to
this erosion of three core safeguards as informational overreaching.
The relational paradigm provides scant protection from informational
overreaching. Senior officials do not view judges as a key constituency,
particularly in times of crisis. The judgment and discretion of prosecutors,
which is traditionally tempered in ordinary times by interaction with judges,
is more responsive to pervasive signaling from superiors to keep
information guarded and seize every opportunity to shape the public debate.
In times of crisis, therefore, the relational paradigm resembles what its
critics have always viewed as a posture of "helpless piety," rather than
effective regulation.
To respond to the failure of the relational paradigm in times of crisis,
courts should adopt an institutional approach to curbing informational
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overreaching. Under the institutional paradigm, courts become a
counterweight to the excess of prosecutors. Abandoning the cozy sanctions
of the relational approach, the institutional paradigm seeks wholesale
reform of prosecutorial practices, much as courts have reformed state
institutions, such as prisons, psychiatric hospitals, and school systems. The
institutional approach also draws authority and inspiration from the ex ante
approach to deterring law enforcement misconduct that the Supreme Court
modeled in Miranda v. Arizona.
An institutional approach has three core components. First, to affirm
particularity, courts should require greater comprehensiveness in affidavits
supporting the issuance of warrants. Building on Franks v. Delaware, the
courts should require specificity, rejecting amorphous government
justifications based on an individual's failure to come forward or
immigration status. Second, courts should adopt a presumption of prejudice
in cases involving a pattern of governmental misconduct. A presumption
reduces both the risk of residual prejudice, which is not reached by existing
mechanisms such as questioning of jurors, and the asymmetries in
prosecutors' incentives that encourage overreaching in times of crisis. A
presumption of prejudice would also encourage courts to react robustly to
the policies of the executive that create manifest prejudice, as in the
withholding of access to witnesses in the Moussaoui case. Finally, the
institutional approach stresses organizational integrity over mere subjective
good faith, in order to encourage the development of systems of
accountability within law enforcement.
The institutional approach must contend with two significant critiques.
The first critique, centered on separation of powers concerns, argues that an
activist approach by courts will intrude excessively on prerogatives of the
executive branch. Responding to this concern, courts should tailor their
approach to impose the minimum authority needed to ensure disclosure and
fairness on the part of the government. Certain governmental practices,
such as profligate discussion of the details of pending cases, may be chilled
as a result. However, greater discipline on the part of the executive in such
areas may be a constructive addition to legitimate anti-terrorism efforts.
The second critique argues that the institutional approach may have
unintended consequences, including legislative attempts to broaden anti-
terrorism legislation to circumvent new strictures in the law of criminal
procedure. Here, again, a carefully tailored approach by courts will
minimize adverse reactions. Moreover, the Constitution itself supplies
substantial protection against further broadening of anti-terrorist legislation,
which is already at the outer boundary of permissibility under the First
Amendment. Executive attempts to bar access to information are on an
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even more precarious legal footing because. of the Sixth Amendment's fair
trial guarantees. Courts have the authority to intervene; the only question is
whether they have the will to do so.
An institutional approach would jettison the comfortable pieties of the
relational paradigm and reverse long-standing trends in criminal procedure,
such as the rise of the harmless error doctrine. To avoid this challenging
path, it is tempting to view current government excesses as merely a
momentary aberration. However, when systemic flaws in law enforcement
jeopardize the effective and fair prosecution of terrorist cases, such
quiescence is a luxury the law cannot afford. An institutional response
recognizes the scope of the problem, and commits courts to protection of
core constitutional values endangered by informational overreaching.

